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The standard procedure to establish a secure and trusted communication channel from a client to an enclave is through remote attestation. However, when the client itself is also an enclave and mutual trust between two enclaves is required, we need additional design and implementation effort. The Teaclave platform consists of multiple enclave services and most of the enclave-to-enclave RPC communications need bidirectional authentication. This document entails the methodology and process of Teaclave's mutual enclave remote attestation.
The identity of an enclave is defined through a pair of cryptographically secure hash values, i.e., MRSIGNER and MRENCLAVE. MRSIGNER indicates the builder of the enclave, thus shared by enclaves signed by the same party. MRENCLAVE is unique to each individual enclave. Teaclave assumes that users do not trust the software builder, so verifying MRSIGNER is not enough. For each enclave service in Teaclave, it must strictly check the unique identity of the other enclaves it communicates to through MRENCLAVE.
Since the SGX enclave trusts no outside input, the MRENCLAVE should be hard-coded into source files used for identity verification logic. Therefore, changing the MRENCLAVE value an enclave tries to match against will change the MRENCLAVE of the enclave itself. When two enclaves want to remotely attest each other, it is impossible to decide which enclave is to be built first.
Teaclave resolves this problem by relying on third-party auditors. We assume that there will be several parties trusted by all participants of Teaclave's computation tasks (cloud platforms, data providers, and customers, etc). The source code and binaries of Teaclave are audited by these trusted parties. Once the auditors decided that Teaclave is secure, they sign and publish the identities of audited enclaves. The public keys of the auditors are hard-coded in Teaclave enclave source via build time configuration, while the enclave measures and their signatures are loaded from outside at runtime. Each enclave will verify that the enclave measures are indeed signed by the auditors before serving any requests.
The keys directory in the source tree contain the key pairs of three fake auditing parties for PoC purposes. Private keys are also included to deliver a smooth build and test process. In production, builders of Teaclave should obtain the public keys, enclave identities, and the signatures directly from the auditors.