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alternative security proof #11
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added that this also nicely explains the separation between the prover and the signer, as this is the same as the original undeniable signature syntax. |
I think the GDH signature does provide an easy framework to describe PLUME. Interesting that none of the experts in your acknowledgment recalled GDH. |
This is a great observation. We had been looking at it from the angle of a DDH-VRF and corresponding proofs, and the experts likely didn't have the time to recall GDH in the short conversations we had together or the framing that I imposed for the construction and proofs -- the fault for missing that is mine, not theirs (this was in fact my first cryptography paper so I'm not yet familiar with the full landscape).
I will look at that paper, that's a great find. If you'd be interested in working together to write up a security argument with me for poseidon's proposed v2 version with that argument, I would be happy to :) EDIT: It seems GDH is similar but not quite what we are looking for. |
If possible, we can have a call. I am looking into this question a lot recently, and we are working on something for hardware wallet and have something on the go very quickly into production. We have some thoughts on how to implement it efficiently with zkSNARK. |
Just to add, there is a quick way to prove the PLUME security, in case anyone asks.
This is the GDH undeniable signature with the confirmation protocol replaced with NIZK, and here the NIZK is a classical Chaum-Pedersen protocol.
The GDH undeniable signature can be found here: Tatsuaki Okamoto and David Pointcheval. The gap-problems: A new class of problems for the security of cryptographic schemes. In PKC ’01
This is also discussed in the BLS signature paper. Section 2.2.
Uniqueness comes from hashing to the curve.
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