security(star-rating): forward only the widget's own parameters from /i/feedback/input (24.05) - #7953
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shepardly[bot] merged 5 commits intoAug 27, 2026
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…/i/feedback/input Backport of #7952 to release.24.05. /i/feedback/input accepts a feedback submission from the web widget, which cannot compute a checksum because it does not hold the app's salt, so the handler replays the request into the generic /i processor with no_checksum set. It built that replayed request from the caller's entire query string: url: "/i?" + ob.params.href.split("/i/feedback/input?")[1] The handler's only check is on the events parameter, which has to be a single [CLY]_star_rating event. Every other parameter was forwarded untouched and then processed with checksum verification disabled, so a caller holding just the public app key could append unrelated write parameters and have them accepted unsigned on an app that has a checksum salt configured. old_device_id reaches appUsers.merge(), and token_session reaches the push token binding; begin_session, user_details, consent and crash ride along the same way. Rebuild the forwarded query from the parameters the widget actually sends (events, app_key, device_id, sdk_name, sdk_version, timestamp, hour, dow, app_version) and drop everything else, so the star rating submission keeps working while any other operation has to go through /i and satisfy the checksum. Values are URL encoded, so a parameter value cannot inject a second parameter, and non scalar values are dropped rather than stringified, since a JSON body can put an object in a query string parameter. The helper lives in api/input-utils.js so it can be unit tested; the existing plugin tests only vary device_id and never sent old_device_id here, so they are unaffected. Note this is the only unauthenticated no_checksum forwarder: the sole other no_checksum caller is api/utils/taskmanager.js, which replays a stored task URL created by an authenticated user. Reported through the security bug bounty programme (received 2026-08-18). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The changelog is generated from PR and commit titles later, so an entry written by hand here is duplicated work at best. It is also the single worst file in this wave for conflicts: every merge to the base appends a line, which re-conflicts every open branch that also appends one. Eight of the sixteen conflicts across these security PRs today were this file and nothing else, and two of them came back within the hour. Only the lines this branch added are removed - the file is otherwise the base's, and the change here was purely additive, so nothing else moves.
Cookiezaurs
approved these changes
Aug 27, 2026
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Backport of #7952 to
release.24.05./i/feedback/inputreplays its request into the generic/iprocessor withno_checksumset, because the web feedback widget cannot compute a checksum (it does not hold the app's salt). It built that replayed request from the caller's entire query string, and the handler's only check is onevents(a single[CLY]_star_ratingevent). Every other parameter was forwarded and then processed with checksum verification disabled.On an app with a checksum salt configured, a caller holding only the public app key could therefore append unrelated write parameters and have them accepted unsigned:
old_device_idreachesappUsers.merge(),token_sessionreaches the push token binding, andbegin_session/user_details/consent/crashride along the same way.Fix (identical to #7952): rebuild the forwarded query from the parameters the widget actually sends —
events,app_key,device_id,sdk_name,sdk_version,timestamp,hour,dow,app_version— and drop everything else. Values are URL encoded so a value cannot inject a second parameter, and non-scalars are dropped rather than stringified. The 24.05 widget sends the same nine parameters as master, so the allowlist is unchanged.Tests:
test/unit-tests/star-rating.input-utils.js, 8 cases, all passing on this branch;eslintclean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code