docs(deploy): two-phase deploy, revert, by-reference deploys, and OIDC trusted publishing - #599
docs(deploy): two-phase deploy, revert, by-reference deploys, and OIDC trusted publishing#599dawsontoth wants to merge 31 commits into
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…ivate CLI Document the two-phase deploy behavior and the new surface from HarperFast/harper#1849: - deploy_component: cluster-wide stage -> barrier -> activate; new properties activate:false (stage-and-stop, returns a staged deployment_id), deployment_id (activate a previously-staged deployment), revert_on_failure, two_phase, and the ignore_replication_errors / deployment_timeout knobs. - revert_component: fast cluster-wide rollback to the retained previous version. - Deployment lifecycle: stage/activate phase names, staged/staging/activating/ rolled_back statuses, and staged-build retention (deployment_stagingRetention_maxCount). - CLI: harper stage / activate / revert verbs (aliases + examples). Companion to HarperFast/harper#1849 (still a draft). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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This pull request updates the documentation for the CLI and Operations API to reflect the new two-phase deployment process (staging and activation) and the rollback mechanism (revert_component). It introduces new CLI commands, aliases, API parameters, and examples. The review feedback suggests improving consistency by pointing the new CLI operation category links to the main #components section, and enhancing readability in the API documentation by adding clear labels to the multi-step "Stage now, activate later" JSON examples.
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…tage/activate example Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Conflict in reference/operations-api/operations.md was additive: main added the `credentials` parameter plus its "Deploy credentials" section (#581) where this branch adds the two-phase parameters. Kept both — the parameter list now carries activate/deployment_id/revert_on_failure/ignore_replication_errors/ deployment_timeout/two_phase AND credentials, followed by main's credentials section. main's get_deployment_payload / delete_deployment_payload docs (#600) are untouched.
… values Documents harper-pro#594 and syncs with harper#1849's latest behavior. add_ssh_key `generate: true` (harper-pro#594): - Harper mints the ed25519 keypair on the node and returns only `public_key`, so the private key is never carried in a request body, shell history, or CI log. Includes the response shape and the `harper:<name>` comment. - `key` and `generate` are mutually exclusive; ssh-keygen must be on PATH. - Notes that `public_key` is returned ONLY on the generating call — Harper does not retain it, and update_ssh_key requires a key you supply (it cannot mint one), so the recovery path is delete_ssh_key + add_ssh_key generate again. - CLI example added alongside the deploy/stage/activate/revert examples. Payload retention (harper#1849): - Splits the old one-line aside into its own subsection with a table covering both bounds: payloadRetention_maxSize (10 MiB, bounds a single payload) and the new payloadRetention_maxCount (default 1, bounds how many are kept per project). Explains why the default is conservative, that rows are never deleted, and that a reclaimed payload reports payload_blob_present: false. Also: - revert_on_failure / ignore_replication_errors now note they apply to a `deployment_id` activate too, matching the peer-failure gate added to that path. - list_deployments `status` listed only 5 of 13 real values; replaced with terminal vs in-flight groupings. - New note on restartRequired: deploying a brand-new component without a restart marks one as required (per node), while redeploying a live component does not.
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…cument them The SSH rows linked to #certificate-management, but the SSH operations are documented under ## Components — so every one of those seven links landed the reader in the wrong section. Repointed them to #components (the convention the other 15 component rows already use). Auditing the same block turned up the identical defect on the six user/role rows (list_users, add_user, alter_user, drop_user, list_roles, drop_role), which are documented under ## Users & Roles. Repointed those to #users--roles, matching the existing link to that section elsewhere in the docs. The five genuine certificate rows (create_csr, sign_certificate, list_certificates, add_certificate, remove_certificate) were already correct and are unchanged. Category labels updated to match their new targets. Verified every operations.md anchor referenced from this table against the real headings — all 11 resolve.
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Builds on the two-phase deploy docs (#599) to cover the rest of the deploy-by-reference workflow. reference/components/applications.md - "Deploying by Reference" — `harper deploy by_ref=true`, `ref=`, `credential=`. Explains why a reference pins to a resolved SHA rather than the tag or branch name typed: peers resolve the package independently, so a tag that moves mid-deploy could otherwise leave nodes running different code. Notes that the cluster clones the pushed remote, and that by-reference means the cluster builds from source — so an app whose build can't run on the node should stay on payload deploys. - "Provisioning a Deploy Credential" — `harper deploy setup=true`, the client-side sealing flow, and that reverting to the previous version needs no credential at all. reference/cli/authentication.md - Documents HARPER_CLI_REFRESH_TOKEN / HARPER_CLI_OPERATION_TOKEN and adds "Token credentials for CI/CD", so the CI guidance is no longer "put an admin password in your pipeline". Covers precedence, in-memory-only refresh, and token lifetimes (1d / 30d defaults). - Warns that a user holds only ONE valid refresh token at a time: issuing a new one invalidates the last, so a routine local `harper login` silently breaks a pipeline using the same account. Hence the recommendation to give CI its own user. (Verified against security/tokenAuthentication.ts, which stores a single hashed refresh_token per user record.) reference/cli/commands.md - `harper login --for-ci`, including the stdout/stderr split that makes `| gh secret set --env-file -` work without displaying the token. reference/security/secrets.md - Points the existing private-source deploy credentials section at the CLI flow that automates it. Documents HarperFast/harper#1850, #1851, and #1876. Verified every anchor link in the changed files resolves (16 checked). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Opened #616 stacked on this branch: docs(deploy): by-reference deploys, sealed credentials, CI token auth. It targets Where the two meet: this PR documents the two-phase deploy and |
…vert caveat Addresses cb1kenobi's review on #599. - "Terminal" wrongly included `staged`. The implementation's TERMINAL_STATUSES is {success, failed, rolled_back} and that set gates get_deployment_payload and payload-pruning eligibility, so listing `staged` as terminal contradicted the get_deployment_payload section. Split into Terminal / Resting / In flight, and noted why a resting payload is deliberately still held. - get_deployment's `status` row listed 7 of 13 values; now lists all, pointing at the grouped explanation. - The `restart: "rolling"` example's response showed the no-restart message. Corrected to the rolling shape (restartJobId + ", restarting Harper") and noted what the no-restart response looks like instead. - revert_component: added a caution that reverting swaps live directories and does NOT rewrite the stored `package:` reference, so a node provisioned after a revert installs the reverted-away version. Verified in code: revertComponent never calls writeComponentRootConfig, and installApplications() installs from root config. - deployment_id activate: documents that the staged package identifier and credential references are recovered and persisted at activation (fixed in harper#1849), so `package` need not be repeated on the activate call.
`HARPER_CLI_REFRESH_TOKEN` / `HARPER_CLI_OPERATION_TOKEN` shipped in v5.2.0 (harper#1876) but never reached the reference docs. The Authentication Precedence list stopped at the saved `harper login` token, so the two variables a CI pipeline is supposed to use were absent from the one place that states which credential wins. Folded into main's existing numbered list rather than stated separately, so the order is given once: bearer tokens sit at position 5, above the saved login token and above the legacy `username=`/`password=` fallback, which is what cliOperations.ts does. Also documents the parts that are only discoverable by reading the source: - Token variables apply to remote targets only. A local operation goes over the domain socket and is already trusted, so attaching a bearer token there would opt out of that trust and 401 — hence the deliberate ignore. - A token namespace owns both halves. `HARPER_CLI_OPERATION_TOKEN` cannot pair with `CLI_TARGET_REFRESH_TOKEN`, which would otherwise run as one identity until expiry and then silently continue as another. - A set-but-blank namespace reports and falls back rather than silently running as whoever last logged in locally. - An env-sourced refreshed token stays in memory; there is no file entry to persist it to. - One refresh-token hash per user, so `--for-ci` as your own account revokes your own token. Hence the dedicated-CI-user warning. `harper login --for-ci` is documented in commands.md with the stdout/stderr split that makes `| gh secret set --env-file -` work without displaying the token. Verified against harper v5.2.2: bin/cliOperations.ts (precedence and refresh), bin/login.ts (--for-ci output), config/configUtils.ts (1d / 30d defaults). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The other half of @kriszyp's discoverability finding, for the piece that actually shipped in v5.2.0. A user who only reads release notes had no way to discover that a pipeline can authenticate with a token instead of an admin password. States the two properties that change how someone sets this up: the token variables outrank a saved login (so a runner with both uses the CI identity), and one refresh-token hash per user means issuing a token for CI revokes your own if you run it as yourself. The 5.3 surface goes in 5.3.md, added on #599.
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#630 was rebased onto main (12 new commits, mostly analytics docs), so this branch picks up the rewritten base. Three conflicts in `authentication.md`, all resolved to this branch's side — the precedence list with OIDC at 7, the corrected blank-token paragraph, and the workload-identity section #630 does not have. Resolved hunk by hunk rather than with `checkout --ours`, which is what silently dropped content the last time. One of those conflicts is worth noting: #630 still carries the original "an error, not a fallback" wording for a blank token namespace, because that paragraph is #630's content and the correction was only ever applied here. Being backported to #630 separately — otherwise #630 publishes the self-contradictory version if it merges first, which it is meant to.
The paragraph contradicted itself: "an error, not a fallback", then described the fallback, then denied the behavior it had just described. The CLI warns and continues down the precedence list, which does mean running as whoever last logged in on that machine — the warning is the only thing that makes it non-silent. Caught by a review pass against #599, where this text also lives. Fixing it only there would have left this PR publishing the wrong version, since this is the PR that owns the paragraph and the one meant to merge first.
Re-checked against harper's tags, which have moved twice since the badges were set. main is now 5.2.4, and `git tag --contains` on each merge commit says: | Surface | Upstream | Ships in | | --- | --- | --- | | `deploy by_ref=true` | harper#1850 | **v5.2.3** | | `deploy setup=true` | harper#1851 | **v5.2.3** | | `add_ssh_key generate` | harper-pro#594 | **v5.2.4** | | OIDC trusted publishing | harper#2173 | merged, unreleased -> v5.3.0 | | two-phase, `revert_component` | harper#1849 | still draft -> v5.3.0 | So the badges were wrong in the other direction this time: content marked v5.3.0 has been in users' hands since 5.2.3. Corrected the four affected markers — Deploying by Reference, Provisioning a Deploy Credential, the `deploy setup` mention in secrets.md, and the `generate` subsection. The two-phase and OIDC badges stay at v5.3.0. Release notes follow the same split. `5.3.md` keeps two-phase, stage/activate, rollback, and OIDC; by-reference deploys, sealed credentials, and server-side SSH keygen move to `5.2.md` under Components and Security, each labelled with the patch that shipped it. The repo keeps one page per minor and points patches at GitHub releases, so a feature that landed in a patch is otherwise undiscoverable from the docs. That the badges were wrong twice, in opposite directions, is the argument for the `git tag --contains` check now recorded in AGENTS.md rather than reading a branch's package.json.
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Per review direction: guide readers to pick a single credential style rather than leaving them to combine a token with raw credentials. Checking the existing text rather than assuming it already said this — it did not, quite. Line 111 said "prefer a token over `HARPER_CLI_PASSWORD`", which is a preference between two *environment* credentials and silent on the payload `username=`/`password=` pair. The part that matters, keeping payload credentials off a command a token is meant to authenticate, sat inside the 403 warning, so it only reached a reader who opened that box. Now a single rule directly under the precedence list, where it belongs: precedence exists to resolve a conflict and resolves it silently, and every bad outcome this page documents needs two styles live at once — a payload pair taking over when a token stops resolving, a blank token variable handing the run to a saved login. A small table maps context to style (pipeline / one-off admin command / local development). The 403 warning and the pipeline advice now defer to the rule instead of each carrying a partial version of it. Also drops a `#workload-identity-oidc` link I had reached for out of habit: that section lives on #599, not this branch, and the build caught it as a broken anchor. Back to the two pre-existing anchors on main.
The other half of @kriszyp's discoverability finding, for the piece that actually shipped in v5.2.0. A user who only reads release notes had no way to discover that a pipeline can authenticate with a token instead of an admin password. States the two properties that change how someone sets this up: the token variables outrank a saved login (so a runner with both uses the CI identity), and one refresh-token hash per user means issuing a token for CI revokes your own if you run it as yourself. The 5.3 surface goes in 5.3.md, added on #599.
The paragraph contradicted itself: "an error, not a fallback", then described the fallback, then denied the behavior it had just described. The CLI warns and continues down the precedence list, which does mean running as whoever last logged in on that machine — the warning is the only thing that makes it non-silent. Caught by a review pass against #599, where this text also lives. Fixing it only there would have left this PR publishing the wrong version, since this is the PR that owns the paragraph and the one meant to merge first.
Per review direction: guide readers to pick a single credential style rather than leaving them to combine a token with raw credentials. Checking the existing text rather than assuming it already said this — it did not, quite. Line 111 said "prefer a token over `HARPER_CLI_PASSWORD`", which is a preference between two *environment* credentials and silent on the payload `username=`/`password=` pair. The part that matters, keeping payload credentials off a command a token is meant to authenticate, sat inside the 403 warning, so it only reached a reader who opened that box. Now a single rule directly under the precedence list, where it belongs: precedence exists to resolve a conflict and resolves it silently, and every bad outcome this page documents needs two styles live at once — a payload pair taking over when a token stops resolving, a blank token variable handing the run to a saved login. A small table maps context to style (pipeline / one-off admin command / local development). The 403 warning and the pipeline advice now defer to the rule instead of each carrying a partial version of it. Also drops a `#workload-identity-oidc` link I had reached for out of habit: that section lives on #599, not this branch, and the build caught it as a broken anchor. Back to the two pre-existing anchors on main.
#630 merged, so this branch retargeted to `main` and conflicted on the three files it shares. The conflict was lopsided rather than symmetric: this branch carried the token content as it stood when #630 was first merged in, while `main` now has that same content after fourteen review rounds — the one-style rule, the 403-on-expiry warning, the loopback/`authorizeLocal` material, the corrected saved-target fallback, `CLI_TARGET_OPERATION_TOKEN`, and the trimmed rationale. So resolving hunk-by-hunk would have been reconciling an obsolete copy against a corrected one. Instead: took `main`'s version of all three files wholesale, verified each was byte-identical to `main`, then re-applied this branch's only real contribution to them — the OIDC additions — on top. `authentication.md` is now +53 against `main` rather than a full-file conflict. Two things the re-application had to reconcile, because `main` gained content that interacts with OIDC: - The rejected-exchange paragraph said the operation "returns 401" when nothing else is configured. That is now only true off-loopback: per the hinge @kriszyp established, a credential-less request to a loopback node is authorized as superuser, so a policy mismatch there succeeds with no identity check. Stated, and cross-linked to the refresh-behavior note rather than repeating it. - Workload identity added to the one-style table's CI/CD row, since it is now a second valid choice for that context. Also caught myself re-introducing an inline `<VersionBadge>` in the precedence list — the same CONTRIBUTING violation I fixed on #630 an hour ago. Plain text.
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Same reasoning as the by_ref content: harper-pro#594 merged 2026-08-20 and `git tag --contains` puts it in **v5.2.4**, so it is shipped and should not wait on harper#1849. - `generate: true` mints an ed25519 keypair on the node and returns only the public half, so a deploy key's private half never travels in a request body, shell history, or CI log. Generation is in-process (`node:crypto`), needing no `ssh-keygen` binary on the host. - `public_key` comes back only on the generating call — Harper does not retain it — so the recovery path is delete-and-regenerate, since `update_ssh_key` cannot mint. - The encryption-at-rest claim is qualified rather than absolute. `sealSSHKey` falls back to storing and replicating the private key in **plaintext** with only a WARN when no secret custody is registered, and that fallback is deliberate — SSH keys predate custody. So it is a property of the deployment's configuration, not of the operation, which matters most for `generate: true` because that reads as though the key could never be exposed. Custody is present by default, and the note says so rather than implying the risk is likely. Also restores the 5.2.4 release-note entry, which I dropped when I took main's `5.2.md` wholesale during the #599 merge — the same whole-file resolution hazard that cost content once already in this session. Verifying the file matched main confirmed the take succeeded but said nothing about what #599 uniquely added.
Main gained four `node.hostname` commits while this branch was being restructured, one of which created `release-notes/v5-lincoln/5.3.md` independently of the copy this branch already had. That produced an add/add conflict. Resolved by combining rather than choosing: this branch's Deployment and Security sections (two-phase, stage/activate, rollback, OIDC) plus main's Node Identity section. Picking either side would have silently dropped a release's worth of notes for the other's feature. Worth noting how this surfaced — not from the conflict, but from `options.md` appearing in this branch's diff as though it were *reverting* main's new `## node` section. A docs branch showing deletions it never made is the signal that its base has moved.
Removes what #636 now owns, so this PR is purely surface gated on harper#1849 (draft) or unreleased: - `reference/components/applications.md` — Deploying by Reference and Provisioning a Deploy Credential (both v5.2.3). The page returns to Package Sources followed by Dependency Management. - `reference/operations-api/operations.md` — the `add_ssh_key` section reverts to main's, handing the `generate` subsection and its custody caveat (v5.2.4) over. - `reference/security/secrets.md` — the `deploy setup=true` pointer. One point was relocated rather than dropped. The credential section carried a note that rolling back needs no credential, which is a fact about `revert_component` rather than about provisioning, and `revert_component` stays here. It now sits in that operation's own docs, phrased for why it matters: a revert re-fetches nothing, so it still works when the token or deploy key that installed the current version has expired or been revoked — which is often the situation you are in when you need to roll back. What remains is two-phase deploy, `revert_component`, the deployment lifecycle and retention, the CLI stage/activate/revert rows, and OIDC.
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Splits the shipped half of #599 out so it can merge on its own. Everything here documents behavior in **v5.2.3** — `git tag --contains` on harper#1850's and harper#1851's merge commits returns v5.2.3 and v5.2.4 — while #599 is gated on harper#1849, still a draft. Accurate docs for a shipped feature should not wait on unshipped work. Carries the corrected text, not #599's original: the corrections that lived in #617 are folded in here, so there is no window where the published page describes the superseded parameter form. - **Deploying by Reference** — `harper deploy by_ref=true`, `ref=`, `credential=true`. A reference pins to a resolved SHA: refs resolve from the local checkout, then from the remote when it is absent (a shallow CI clone usually has neither), and the deploy fails closed if neither can name a commit, because peers resolve the package independently. A ref must also name something a clone can fetch — `refs/heads/*` or `refs/tags/*` — so `refs/pull/123/head` is rejected up front even where the local checkout resolves it. A pinned SHA fixes the source revision, not the built artifact. - **`credential=true`** derives the host from the package, so the credential always matches the clone it authenticates; an explicitly named host that does not match is rejected rather than silently unused. - **GitHub Actions behavior** — the unpushed-commit check is skipped there (the runner's checkout is not a branch `git branch -r --contains` can see) while the dirty-tree warning still applies, and a `pull_request` run deploys the PR's head commit rather than the merge commit the runner checks out. - **Provisioning a Deploy Credential** — `harper deploy setup=true`, the client-side sealing flow, the two providers it supports, and that it needs super_user because it calls `get_secrets_public_key` and `set_secret`. - `reference/security/secrets.md` points its private-source section at the CLI flow, and `5.2.md` gains the two release-note entries. The `revert_component` cross-reference from the credential section is deliberately left on #599: `revert_component` is unshipped, and the build caught the dangling anchor when it came across.
Same reasoning as the by_ref content: harper-pro#594 merged 2026-08-20 and `git tag --contains` puts it in **v5.2.4**, so it is shipped and should not wait on harper#1849. - `generate: true` mints an ed25519 keypair on the node and returns only the public half, so a deploy key's private half never travels in a request body, shell history, or CI log. Generation is in-process (`node:crypto`), needing no `ssh-keygen` binary on the host. - `public_key` comes back only on the generating call — Harper does not retain it — so the recovery path is delete-and-regenerate, since `update_ssh_key` cannot mint. - The encryption-at-rest claim is qualified rather than absolute. `sealSSHKey` falls back to storing and replicating the private key in **plaintext** with only a WARN when no secret custody is registered, and that fallback is deliberate — SSH keys predate custody. So it is a property of the deployment's configuration, not of the operation, which matters most for `generate: true` because that reads as though the key could never be exposed. Custody is present by default, and the note says so rather than implying the risk is likely. Also restores the 5.2.4 release-note entry, which I dropped when I took main's `5.2.md` wholesale during the #599 merge — the same whole-file resolution hazard that cost content once already in this session. Verifying the file matched main confirmed the take succeeded but said nothing about what #599 uniquely added.
harper#1849 is closed, and so are #2135 and #2301 which were stacked on it — #2135's base was `claude/deploy-component-two-phase-94969a`, not `main`. None of `revert_component`, `two_phase`, `activateStagedApplication`, `deployComponentTwoPhase` or `stagingRetention` exists in `main`. So this PR's subject is not merely unmerged, it is abandoned in that form. There was no reason for the content whose upstream *is* settled to wait with it. Extracted to #637: - **OIDC trusted publishing** — harper#2173 is merged (2026-08-21), awaiting v5.3.0. The API is fixed, which is the difference that matters: the risk here was never "unreleased", it was "changing underneath the docs". - **The ops-table anchor fix** — 13 rows pointing at `#certificate-management`, which documents neither user/role nor SSH operations. A pre-existing docs bug with no upstream dependency, which should never have been behind a feature branch. - **The `AGENTS.md` badge guidance.** What stays is two-phase deploy, `revert_component`, deploy modes, activation failures, the deployment status groupings, retention, and the 5.3 Deployment release notes. Kept here deliberately, despite looking extractable: the status groupings and retention text. `list_deployments` and `get_deployment` are shipped, so the corrections read as generic — but they enumerate `staged`, `staging`, `activating`, `reverting`, `extracting` and `loading`, while `main` defines only `pending`, `installing`, `replicating`, `restarting`, `success`, `failed` and `rolled_back`. Extracting them would publish statuses that do not exist. Same for retention, which mixes the shipped payload bound with the unshipped staging one.
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Extracts from #599 everything whose upstream is settled, now that harper#1849 has been **closed** — with #2135 and #2301, which were stacked on it — leaving no two-phase surface in main at all. **OIDC trusted publishing** (harper#2173, merged 2026-08-21, awaiting v5.3.0). Unlike the two-phase work this is merged, so the API is fixed and only the release is pending: - `add_oidc_trust` / `list_oidc_trust` / `drop_oidc_trust` (super_user) and the unauthenticated `exchange_oidc_token`, with the replace-not-merge semantics. - The GitHub Actions policy-specificity rules as a table — pin the repository, pin the workflow, gate the ref — with what each leaves open unsatisfied, since the ref gate is stricter than npm's model and is the rule most likely to refuse a real workflow. - The `operations` scope, including that it covers the Operations API and SQL but **not** an application's REST/GraphQL path, so it bounds what CI can administer rather than what data it reaches (harper#2201 tracks that gap). - Single-use tokens with an honest account of the cross-node replay race; one rejection message for every failure with the reason in the `oidc-trust` log; `drop_oidc_trust` not revoking already-issued tokens. - The CLI exchange as precedence entry 7 — ranked below every configured credential, so adding `id-token: write` to a workflow that still sets a token secret does not silently change identity. **Ops-table anchors.** Six user/role rows and seven SSH rows pointed at `#certificate-management`, which documents neither. Repointed to `#users--roles` and `#components`; the five genuine certificate rows are untouched. A pre-existing docs bug with no upstream dependency, which is why it should not have been sitting behind a feature branch. **`AGENTS.md`** gains the rule that produced most of this stack's version churn: derive a badge from core's git tags, not from a feature branch's `package.json`, and re-check every refresh pass. Deliberately left on #599: the deployment status groupings. They read as generic tracking corrections, but they enumerate `staged`, `staging`, `activating`, `reverting`, `extracting` and `loading` — and main's code defines only `pending`, `installing`, `replicating`, `restarting`, `success`, `failed` and `rolled_back`. Extracting them would document statuses that do not exist.
So this is not waiting on a merge. It is waiting on a decision about whether the feature is being revived. Someone who owns that call should make it; the docs should follow rather than sit here. If the work returns in a different shape, this drafting is a starting point but should be re-verified against whatever lands, not trusted.
Everything whose upstream is settled has been extracted so it stopped waiting on this:
Held here deliberately, despite looking extractable: the deployment status groupings and the retention text.
list_deploymentsandget_deploymentare shipped, so those corrections read as generic tracking fixes — but they enumeratestaged,staging,activating,reverting,extractingandloading, whilemaindefines onlypending,installing,replicating,restarting,success,failedandrolled_back. Extracting them would document statuses that do not exist. The retention text likewise mixes the shipped payload bound with the unshipped staging one.Fourteen findings from this PR's last review round remain unverified, including a major on the documented payload-retention bounds not matching pruning behavior. They were recorded rather than checked. Given that a third of the automated findings on the sibling PRs turned out to be false positives from reading the wrong branch, each needs verifying against whatever the two-phase implementation finally looks like — which is another reason to settle the feature's status first.
What this documents
Six files, not the two the previous description listed. The cluster-wide deploy lifecycle, rollback, deploy-by-reference, sealed deploy credentials, server-side SSH keygen, and OIDC trusted publishing.
deploy by_ref=true/ref=/credential=deploy setup=trueadd_ssh_key generate: truerevert_component, staging retentionTwo things changed since the last review pass
The versions have moved twice, and are no longer uniform. harper
mainis at 5.2.4, andgit tag --containson each merge commit puts by-reference deploys and sealed credentials in v5.2.3 and server-side SSH keygen in v5.2.4 — all three are in users' hands already. OIDC merged 2026-08-21 and is unreleased; two-phase is still a draft. Both of those carryv5.3.0, confirmed by the5-3-0.tsupgrade directive on main. Release notes are split the same way: the shipped features moved to5.2.mdlabelled with their patch, and5.3.mdkeeps two-phase and OIDC.The one piece that genuinely shipped in v5.2.0 has left.
login --for-ciand the token env vars (harper#1876, in v5.2.0 since 2026-07-31) are now #630, againstmain, mergeable today. That answers @Ethan-Arrowood's first sequencing question — the shipped half no longer waits on four unmerged PRs — and it puts the token rules insidemain's canonical numbered Authentication Precedence section rather than in a competing paragraph beside it.Review feedback
@kriszyp's eight findings (CHANGES_REQUESTED), each re-checked against upstream as it stands now rather than as it stood when filed. Four had been fixed at the source in the meantime.
refnot resolved to a SHA5c85714b8,26cce986d,21043f994).restartdocumented as optional.auth_*vs. ordinaryusername=precedencemain's canonical list covers it, #630 extends it.5.3.md.revert_componentrow.Worth expanding on three:
#### Activation failuressection rather than sitting mid-parameter-list, and the opening paragraph points at it.activate: falseanddeployment_idare rejected when combined withtwo_phase: false,replicated: false, or an unreplicatedsystemdatabase, so a request that says stage-only can no longer activate. There is now a valid-combinations table, including thatrevert_on_failureis refused rather than ignored.sealSSHKeystill stores and replicates the private key in plaintext with a WARN when no secret custody is registered, deliberately, since SSH keys predate custody. So encryption at rest is a property of the deployment's configuration, not of the operation — stated as a warning, while noting custody is present by default so the risk doesn't read as likely.@Ethan-Arrowood's structural hold is addressed:
main— resolved by hand, and it was the hazard he predicted. The ops table needed a three-way merge:main's seven backup rows (create_backup,list_backups,verify_backup,delete_backup,purge_backups,restore_backup,get_backup), this branch's four deploy rows, and this branch's recategorization. Taking either side wholesale would have silently dropped one set. I compared both sides row by row first and confirmed no description text differed, so the width churn is only Prettier re-padding.authentication.mdno longer states precedence twice, since docs(cli): token credentials in the canonical auth precedence (v5.2.0) #630 owns that file's content.(draft)in the title — the first is gone with the split, this description is rewritten, the title marker is dropped in favour of GitHub's own draft state.system-replication precondition (his second question) — now documented. A plain deploy on a cluster withsystemexcluded from replication silently takes the one-shot path, which also means no rollback target; the staged parameters are rejected rather than downgraded.@cb1kenobi's five findings were fixed in the previous pass and remain so.
Still open
deployment_stagingRetention_maxCountanddeployment_payloadRetention_*are documented inline, not inreference/configuration/options.md. @Ethan-Arrowood is right that operators look there, and right that the original justification ("matching howpayloadRetention_maxSizeis surfaced") was false — it isn't surfaced anywhere. Left as-is deliberately: three config keys for an unreleased feature seem better added when the options page can be updated in one pass against the shipping release. Happy to add them here instead.revert_componentdepend on an unmerged PR, so the marker names harper#1849 alone. Everything else is shipped or merged — which makes splitting the ungated content into its own PR worth considering rather than holding it behind a draft.Verification
npm run buildandnpm run format:checkclean. The build reports two broken anchors; both are pre-existing onmain(confirmed by buildingmainwith these changes stashed) and neither is in a file this PR touches. Claims re-verified against the upstream branches; harper#2173's description has since been updated by its author and no longer diverges. Fourteen findings from the third cross-model round remain unaddressed and unverified — see the review-coverage note below.Description drafted by Claude Code (Opus 5).