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Security: Victoria824/QueryAssure

SECURITY.md

Security policy

QueryAssure evaluates systems that may touch sensitive schemas and SQL traces. Please do not include credentials, personal information, proprietary schemas, production query results, or private model prompts in public issues.

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.5.x Yes
0.4.x and earlier No

Reporting a vulnerability

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow:

https://github.com/Victoria824/QueryAssure/security/advisories/new

Include the affected version, impact, minimal sanitized reproduction, and any suggested mitigation. Please allow a reasonable remediation window before public disclosure.

Scope

Reports about write-query bypasses, sensitive-column policy bypasses, unsafe credential handling, Microsoft Graph permission or approval bypasses, dependency compromise, or unintentional data transmission are in scope. Model quality disagreements without a security or privacy impact belong in the public issue tracker.

Security defaults

  • SQL is parsed as exactly one query before execution.
  • DuckDB is opened read-only with external access and extension loading disabled.
  • Query execution is bounded by time, row, memory, temporary-storage, and thread limits.
  • Evidence reports remove result rows and redact common credential-shaped fields.
  • Live model API access is off unless QUERYASSURE_LIVE_ENABLED=true.
  • Live Microsoft Graph access is off unless QUERYASSURE_GRAPH_LIVE_ENABLED=true.
  • Graph actions validate delegated scopes; email sends and Teams posts are approval-gated in the reference workflow.
  • OAuth credentials are supplied directly to the transport and excluded from workflow traces and evidence reports.
  • Set QUERYASSURE_API_TOKEN whenever the API is reachable by another user or host.
  • Docker Compose publishes only on loopback and runs both images as non-root.

QueryAssure is not a sandbox for hostile tenants. Warehouse permissions remain the final authorization boundary. For public or multi-user deployments, run execution in an ephemeral isolated worker, add an authenticated gateway with per-user rate limits, and avoid returning raw schemas or query results unless the caller is authorized.

There aren't any published security advisories