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Project sidecar writer registry - #1058

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bootjp wants to merge 24 commits into
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design/encryption-stage7-projection
Open

Project sidecar writer registry#1058
bootjp wants to merge 24 commits into
mainfrom
design/encryption-stage7-projection

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@bootjp

@bootjp bootjp commented Jul 10, 2026

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Summary

  • project WriterRegistryForCaller from the writer registry in GetSidecarState and ResyncSidecar
  • wire the writer registry into each shard's EncryptionAdmin server
  • mark Stage 7 writer-registry projection shipped in the encryption design docs

Validation

  • git diff --check
  • go test ./adapter -run 'TestEncryptionAdmin_(GetSidecarState|ResyncSidecar)' -count=1 -timeout=240s
  • go test ./adapter -run TestEncryptionAdmin -count=1 -timeout=300s
  • go test ./cmd/elastickv-admin -run 'TestEncryption(Status|Endpoint|Sidecar)' -count=1 -timeout=180s
  • go test ./store ./internal/encryption . -count=1 -timeout=180s
  • golangci-lint run ./adapter ./store ./internal/encryption . --timeout=5m

Author: bootjp

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • 新機能

    • AWS KMS、Google Cloud KMS、Vault Transit、環境変数によるKEK設定に対応しました。
    • 暗号化データの圧縮保存、FUSEファイルシステム、Raft learner、S3 blob連携を追加しました。
    • サイドカー状態取得・再同期で、呼び出し元ごとの情報を返すようになりました。
  • 改善

    • KEKの事前検証と、クラスタ全体の対応確認後の新形式有効化に対応しました。
    • ノードIDの欠落・衝突や不正な暗号化データを適切に拒否します。
    • 再同期時のリーダー確認と読み取り整合性を強化しました。
  • ドキュメント

    • 暗号化、圧縮、KEK、サイドカー投影の実装状況を更新しました。

bootjp commented Jul 10, 2026

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@codex review

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Review Change Stack

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

EncryptionAdminServer、ストレージ暗号化、KEKプロバイダー、クラスタ能力確認、起動配線、FUSE、learner join、S3 blob、Redis Luaキャッシュを更新しました。writer registry投影とStorage Envelope V2切替を追加しました。

Changes

暗号化ストレージとKEK

Layer / File(s) Summary
V2エンベロープとストレージ圧縮
internal/encryption/*, store/*, proto/*
V2エンベロープ、Snappy圧縮、認証後展開、サイズ検証、PebbleおよびSSTの圧縮制御を追加しました。
KEKソースとプロバイダー
internal/encryption/kek/*, go.mod, internal/encryption/startup.go
ファイル、URI、環境変数からKEKソースを選択します。AWS KMS、GCP KMS、Vault Transit、環境変数ラッパー、共通プリフライト検証を追加しました。

クラスタ能力と復旧

Layer / File(s) Summary
能力確認とV2切替
proto/encryption_admin.proto, internal/admin/*, main_encryption_confchange.go, main_encryption_fanout.go, main_encryption_write_wiring.go
CapabilityReportにV2対応情報を追加しました。メンバー追加前に能力を確認し、全メンバーの対応確認後にV2書き込みを有効化します。
サイドカー復旧とregistry投影
adapter/encryption_admin.go, adapter/encryption_admin_test.go, main_encryption_admin.go, multiraft_runtime.go, docs/design/*
GetSidecarStateとResyncSidecarがcaller別のregistry epochを返します。復旧処理には専用leader viewとLinearizableReadを使用します。未配線時は空の非nil mapを返します。

起動と周辺機能

Layer / File(s) Summary
起動配線と周辺サービス
main.go, main_encryption_admin.go, main_encryption_confchange.go, internal/raftadmin/*, proto/service.proto
ロード済みKEK、writer registry、Raft状態を起動処理へ接続しました。FUSE、learner join、S3 blob認証・fetch、条件付きコンポーネント起動を追加しました。
Redis Luaキャッシュ設定
adapter/redis_lua_context.go, adapter/redis_lua_negative_type_cache_test.go
負のキー型キャッシュ上限を設定値から取得するよう変更しました。

Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~120 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to 3b57f

This PR adds caller-scoped encryption writer-state projection and wires recovery service behavior across shards, but the current head still carries merge-readiness risks: existing deployments may select an empty data directory, a known vulnerable gRPC dependency remains, malformed recovery data can make the recovery RPC unavailable, and caller-supplied node identity is not visibly bound to the authenticated peer. These issues should be fixed or explicitly accepted before merging.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant RaftAdmin
  participant EncryptionPreRegister
  participant EncryptionAdminServer
  participant WriterRegistryStore
  RaftAdmin->>EncryptionPreRegister: メンバーIDとアドレスを渡す
  EncryptionPreRegister->>EncryptionAdminServer: GetCapabilityを呼び出す
  EncryptionAdminServer-->>EncryptionPreRegister: ノードIDとV2能力を返す
  EncryptionPreRegister-->>RaftAdmin: メンバー追加可否を返す
  EncryptionAdminServer->>WriterRegistryStore: caller別のregistry行を取得する
  WriterRegistryStore-->>EncryptionAdminServer: last_seen_local_epochを返す
Loading
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Docstring Coverage ⚠️ Warning Docstring coverage is 32.07% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 184 functions across 47 files. Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed タイトルは、WriterRegistry をサイドカーへ投影するというプルリクエストの主要変更を適切に示しています。簡潔で、変更内容を識別できます。
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 2
📝 Generate docstrings 💡
  • Create stacked PR
  • Commit on current branch
⚔️ Resolve merge conflicts 💡
  • Resolve merge conflict in branch design/encryption-stage7-projection

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Code Review

This pull request implements the remaining Stage 7 §5.5 recovery surface for WriterRegistryForCaller by wiring the WriterRegistryStore into EncryptionAdminServer. Both GetSidecarState and ResyncSidecar now project the writer registry for the caller, returning the decoded LastSeenLocalEpoch for each DEK present in the sidecar. The review feedback correctly points out that returning codes.InvalidArgument when fullNodeID == 0 is misleading for GetSidecarState since it uses the local node's ID, and recommends returning codes.FailedPrecondition or codes.Internal instead.

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Comment thread adapter/encryption_admin.go
@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 10, 2026

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Addressed latest-head review finding:

  • GetSidecarState now reports missing local fullNodeID as a server-side Internal error when the writer registry is wired
  • ResyncSidecar keeps returning InvalidArgument for a missing caller-supplied caller_full_node_id

Caller audit:

  • production GetSidecarState caller is cmd/elastickv-admin/encryption.go; Internal bubbles up as a non-zero CLI error instead of being treated as soft unavailable
  • no production ResyncSidecar caller was found

Validation:

  • go test ./adapter -run 'TestEncryptionAdmin_(GetSidecarState|ResyncSidecar)' -count=1 -timeout=240s\n- go test ./adapter -run TestEncryptionAdmin -count=1 -timeout=300s\n- go test ./cmd/elastickv-admin -run 'TestEncryption(Status|Endpoint|Sidecar)' -count=1 -timeout=180s\n- golangci-lint run ./adapter ./store ./internal/encryption . --timeout=5m\n- git diff --check\n- git verify-commit HEAD\n\n@codex review

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: c8c99a0a8c

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Comment thread main.go Outdated
@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 10, 2026

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Addressed latest-head P2 review finding:

  • EncryptionAdmin sidecar projection now uses the default group writer registry for every shard listener, matching the startup/runtime registration authority.
  • Added coverage that non-default runtimes do not supply their per-shard registry to sidecar projection.

Validation:

  • go test ./adapter -run TestEncryptionAdmin -count=1 -timeout=300s
  • go test ./cmd/elastickv-admin -run 'TestEncryption(Status|Endpoint|Sidecar)' -count=1 -timeout=180s\n- go test . -run 'Test(WriterRegistryForEncryptionAdmin|EncryptionAdmin)' -count=1 -timeout=180s\n- go test ./store ./internal/encryption . -count=1 -timeout=180s\n- git diff --check\n- golangci-lint run ./adapter ./store ./internal/encryption . --timeout=5m\n- git verify-commit HEAD\n\n@codex review

@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 11, 2026

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Current head is green and the latest sidecar projection findings have been addressed with tests. @codex review

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Breezy!

Reviewed commit: cbc93a7bd7

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@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 11, 2026

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Current head already handles the remaining sidecar projection thread:

  • GetSidecarState passes codes.Internal for missing local fullNodeID, treating it as server configuration state.
  • ResyncSidecar still passes codes.InvalidArgument for missing caller-supplied caller_full_node_id.

Verification:

  • go test ./adapter -run 'TestEncryptionAdmin_GetSidecarState_(ProjectsWriterRegistryForLocalNode|RejectsMissingLocalNodeIDAsInternal)|TestEncryptionAdmin_ResyncSidecar_(ProjectsWriterRegistryForCaller|RejectsMissingCallerNodeIDAsInvalidArgument)' -count=1 -timeout=120s

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Breezy!

Reviewed commit: cbc93a7bd7

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: b3acb8331c

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Comment thread main.go Outdated
Comment thread store/encryption_glue.go
Comment thread store/encryption_glue.go
@bootjp
bootjp force-pushed the design/encryption-stage7-projection branch from b3acb83 to 39142ba Compare July 19, 2026 11:59
@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 19, 2026

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Resolved the latest-head findings in 39142ba090d5e6ab26fe87a2cf9bf41bd5449e57:

  • recovery projection now uses the default-group LeaderView and applied index on every shard listener
  • compressed storage writes use envelope V2, while V1 remains uncompressed-only, so old readers fail closed
  • visibility-only scans authenticate without Snappy decompression

Caller audit:

  • DecodeEnvelope has two production paths: storage accepts V1/V2 by version/flag contract; Raft additionally requires V1/flag=0
  • plaintext-returning storage callers keep decryptForKey; the two visibility-only callers use authenticateForKey
  • only ResyncSidecar uses the default-group recovery LeaderView; all five mutating RPC callers retain the per-shard requireLeader path

Verification:

  • focused tests: root, adapter, internal/encryption, and store passed
  • focused race tests: root, adapter, internal/encryption, and store passed
  • golangci-lint --config=.golangci.yaml run --fix: 0 issues
  • golangci-lint run . ./adapter ./internal/encryption ./store --timeout=10m --allow-parallel-runners: 0 issues
  • go mod tidy -diff and git diff --check: clean

History/author audit:

  • rebuilt the PR on current main and removed the GitHub-authored merge commit b3acb833
  • git range-diff cd583545..b3acb833 origin/main..20f222eb maps all six source commits in order; four are patch-identical, the two context-only differences are the current-main server struct context and current-main dependency versions
  • the only post-rebuild intentional delta is 39142ba0, containing the three review fixes above
  • GitHub compare reports all seven PR-visible commits as verified=true, with author and committer both bootjp <contact@bootjp.me>
  • the branch is now MERGEABLE; current CI is the remaining gate

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Hooray!

Reviewed commit: 39142ba090

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@bootjp
bootjp force-pushed the design/encryption-stage7-projection branch from 39142ba to 04bfde5 Compare July 19, 2026 14:01
@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 19, 2026

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Rebased the signed stack onto current main 910a97e0 after #1121/#1127/#1130 advanced the base. git range-diff 915bc777..backup/pr1058-39142ba0-v2 origin/main..04bfde58 maps the seven prior commits in order: six are patch-identical; the compression commit differs only where current main moved restore/open logic into reopenStoreDB. The intentional integration delta 04bfde58 threads the encrypted-store NoCompression policy through the new SST snapshot export/ingest callers and adds an encrypted SST snapshot round-trip test. Focused store/root/adapter/provider tests passed with an isolated Go cache, targeted lint reports 0 issues, and the commit hook reports 0 issues. All eight PR-visible commits have author and committer bootjp contact@bootjp.me with valid signatures. @codex review

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Reviewed commit: 04bfde58f0

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Comment thread store/snapshot_pebble_sst.go
Comment thread store/encryption_glue.go
Comment thread main.go Outdated
@bootjp
bootjp force-pushed the design/encryption-stage7-projection branch from 04bfde5 to e34b4de Compare July 19, 2026 15:25
@bootjp

bootjp commented Jul 19, 2026

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Current head: e34b4de

Resolved review findings:

  • P1: EncryptionAdmin mutators are exposed only with default-group authority; non-default listeners are read-only.
  • P1: V2 compressed writes remain off until every voter/learner in every group advertises storage_envelope_v2_capable. Older members that omit the field fail closed. Joining members are probed before registry mutation while encryption is active.
  • P2: encrypted SST snapshot export sets sstable.NoCompression on generated SST writers, not only on the read-only checkpoint DB.

Semantic caller audit:

  • encryptForKey production callers are PutAt, ExpireAt, and mutation apply; all share the same store-local V2 activation gate.
  • MembershipChangeInterceptor.PreAddMember production callers are AddVoter and AddLearner; both pass the candidate address and fail before registry proposal when capability is absent.
  • EncryptionAdmin registration is centralized in startRaftServers; only the default group receives proposer/barrier mutator options.

Validation:

  • make gen
  • focused tests for adapter, root wiring, capability fanout, raft admin, compression gate, and encrypted SST snapshot round-trip
  • go test ./store -count=1 -timeout=10m
  • golangci-lint run ./store ./internal/admin ./internal/raftadmin ./adapter . --timeout=8m --allow-parallel-runners: 0 issues
  • git diff --check
  • all 9 PR-visible commits are bootjp contact@bootjp.me, signed, and GitHub reports verified=true

History audit:

  • 5 of the prior 8 patches are patch-identical after rebuild.
  • The other 3 retain only required current-main integrations for S3 observer arguments, the process-wide shared Pebble cache, and the current SST snapshot API.
  • e34b4de is the review-fix commit.

@codex review

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Reviewed commit: e34b4de8a6

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Comment thread main_encryption_fanout.go Outdated
Comment thread main_encryption_confchange.go
Comment thread main_encryption_confchange.go
@bootjp

bootjp commented Aug 22, 2026

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Codex P2 store/encryption_glue.go:463Defer decompression until after TTL checks に対応しました(748b0787)。これで本 PR の指摘 2 件(P1 / P2)はすべて対応済みです。

確認した挙動: 指摘のとおり readVisibleVersion (store/lsm_store.go:1092) と processFoundValue (:1251) はどちらも decryptForKey(= 展開込み)を tombstone / expireAt チェックのに呼んでいました。期限切れ・トゥームストーンのバージョンも展開してから捨てるため、TTL の多いワークロードでは高圧縮率の値が読み取りごとに最大 maxSnapshotValueSize (256 MiB) を確保し得ますし、死んだ行の不正な圧縮バイトが absent-key ではなく read error になっていました。

ただし「復号を後回しにする」形では直せません。既存コメントにあるとおり、AAD が value header(tombstone ビット / encryption_state / expireAt)を含むため、分岐前に復号して認証することがディスク攻撃者による tombstone 反転・expireAt 引き下げの防止になっています。ここを崩すと silent skip を許します。

そこでご提案どおり 「認証は先、展開だけ後」 に分割しました:

  • decryptAuthenticatedForKey — エンベロープ復号 + GCM open を行い、圧縮されたままの認証済み平文と envelope flag を返す。
  • finishAuthenticatedValue — 展開と空値の正規化(nil[]byte{}ExistsAt の contract 維持)。

両読み取り経路は「認証 → tombstone/expireAt 分岐 → live のときだけ finish」の順になりました。復号回数は従来どおり 1 回です(authenticateForKey を先に呼んでから改めて decryptForKey する形だと GCM が 2 回走るため、そうはしていません)。decryptForKeyMode は 2 つを合成するだけになり、外部から見た挙動は不変です。

Caller audit

  • decryptForKey / authenticateForKey はシグネチャ・意味とも不変。authenticateForKey の既存 2 呼び出し(lsm_store.go:1297 foundValueVisible:2640)も不変です。
  • decryptForKeyMode の呼び出し元は上記 2 つのみ。
  • 新規 decryptAuthenticatedForKey / finishAuthenticatedValue の呼び出し元は decryptForKeyMode と 2 つの読み取り経路だけです。
  • decompressAuthenticatedValue の上限チェック(maxSnapshotValueSize)と ErrEncryptedReadCompression の返し方はそのまま維持しています。

Test evidence

  • 追加 TestEncryptedReadDefersDecompressionPastVisibilityChecks — 圧縮フラグが立つ値で、(1) decryptAuthenticatedForKey の戻り値がまだ展開されていない(元の平文より短い)こと、(2) live なら finishAuthenticatedValue で元のバイト列に戻ること、(3) 認証済み圧縮バイトを壊すと finishAuthenticatedValue が失敗する = 展開をスキップできているかを検出できるプローブになっていること、を検証。
  • go test -race ./store/ → ok (24.8s)
  • golangci-lint run store/... → 0 issues

Self-review

  1. データ損失: なし。読み取り経路のみで、可視性判定の結果は不変。
  2. 並行性 / 分散障害: 影響なし。
  3. パフォーマンス: 本指摘の主目的。期限切れ / トゥームストーンのバージョンで展開とその割り当てが発生しなくなります。live な値のコストは従来と同じ(復号 1 回 + 展開 1 回)。
  4. データ整合性: AAD による header 認証は分岐前のまま維持。空値の正規化も finishAuthenticatedValue に移しただけで挙動は同じです。加えて、期限切れ行の壊れた圧縮バイトが read error ではなく absent key になります(指摘のとおりの改善)。
  5. テスト網羅: 新しい分割の 3 分岐(未展開 / live 完了 / 壊れた圧縮バイト)をカバー。既存の TestEncryptedStoreCompressionRoundTripProperty(rapid プロパティテスト)も decryptForKey 経由でそのまま通ります。

@claude review

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claude Bot commented Aug 22, 2026

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 1m 52s —— View job


Review of 748b0787 — defer decompression past the read visibility checks

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Inspect commit 748b0787 diff in store/encryption_glue.go and store/lsm_store.go
  • Verify auth-before-decompress ordering and AAD/header integrity claims
  • Check new test TestEncryptedReadDefersDecompressionPastVisibilityChecks
  • Check callers of decryptForKeyMode, decryptAuthenticatedForKey, finishAuthenticatedValue
  • Post review feedback

Verdict: fix correctly resolves the P2 finding

I traced the split by hand:

  • decryptAuthenticatedForKey (store/encryption_glue.go:456-483) does exactly what decryptForKeyMode used to do up through cipher.Decrypt, and stops before decompressAuthenticatedValue. The AAD is still built from sv.Tombstone/sv.ExpireAt/sv.EncState (writeValueHeaderBytesbuildStorageAAD) before GCM open, so the security property the doc comments call out — a disk attacker can't flip the tombstone bit or lower expireAt to force a silent skip — is unchanged. Only the Snappy expansion moved.
  • readVisibleVersion (store/lsm_store.go:1092-1118) and processFoundValue (:1259-1281) both now call decryptAuthenticatedForKey first, branch on sv.Tombstone/sv.ExpireAt, and only call finishAuthenticatedValue for a version that's actually going to be returned. A dead/expired row no longer pays the maxSnapshotValueSize allocation, and no longer turns malformed-but-authenticated compressed bytes on a dead row into a read error instead of an absent key — matching the two problems in the original finding.
  • decryptForKeyMode(..., decompress bool) composes the two halves (store/encryption_glue.go:436-445), so decryptForKey (decompress=true) and authenticateForKey (decompress=false) keep their existing external behavior. I grepped all production call sites of decryptForKey/decryptForKeyMode/authenticateForKey/decryptAuthenticatedForKey/finishAuthenticatedValue across store/*.go (excluding tests) and every one of them matches the caller audit in the commit message — lsm_store.go:1297 and :2640 (authenticateForKey, visibility-only, value discarded) are untouched, and no other site decrypts-then-checks-visibility outside the two updated functions.
  • Decryption still happens exactly once per read either way (no double GCM open) — confirmed by reading through both call paths.
  • finishAuthenticatedValue's empty-plaintext normalization (nil[]byte{} for ExistsAt) is preserved and only reached on the live path; authenticateForKey's decompress=false path correctly never needs it since only the error is consulted by its two callers.

Test coverage

TestEncryptedReadDefersDecompressionPastVisibilityChecks (store/encryption_compression_test.go) is a well-targeted regression test: it confirms (1) decryptAuthenticatedForKey's output is still compressed (shorter than the original plaintext), (2) finishAuthenticatedValue round-trips correctly for a live value, and (3) corrupting the still-compressed authenticated bytes makes finishAuthenticatedValue fail — which is the probe that would have caught the pre-fix behavior of always expanding before the visibility check. This satisfies the repo's "review-found defect → failing test first" convention from CLAUDE.md.

Minor, non-blocking observation

decryptForKey (store/encryption_glue.go:424-426) now has no production callers — both readVisibleVersion and processFoundValue call decryptAuthenticatedForKey + finishAuthenticatedValue directly instead. It's still exercised by TestPebbleCompressionPolicy and kept as the documented "read-side counterpart of encryptForKey," which is a reasonable API-symmetry argument, but it's worth knowing it's now effectively a test/convenience helper rather than a hot-path function if it comes up again in future cleanup.

Note on verification

I was not able to execute go test / golangci-lint in this review session (command execution requires interactive approval unavailable here), so this is a static trace of the diff, the AAD/header ordering, and the full set of production call sites — not a test run. The described evidence in the commit message (go test -race ./store/ → ok, golangci-lint run store/... → 0 issues) is consistent with what the code should produce; I'd suggest CI confirm before merge if it hasn't already.

Overall: this closes out both outstanding Codex findings on this PR cleanly, with a correctly targeted regression test.

The mismatched-responder guard exempted a zero full_node_id, so a
responder that does not identify itself passed the check and had its
capabilities credited to the member the snapshot expected. A node with no
sidecar answers GetCapability with full_node_id=0 and
storage_envelope_v2_capable=true, which is exactly the shape that could
slip through under stale routing or a shared address -- the case the
guard exists to reject.

Drop the exemption. The guard still only fires when the snapshot knows
the expected id, so a member the snapshot cannot identify keeps probing
normally.

Downstream, StorageEnvelopeV2Ready also requires EncryptionCapable, which
a sidecar-less node reports false, so this is defence in depth at the
guard rather than a hole that reached activation on its own.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
@bootjp

bootjp commented Aug 22, 2026

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新しく届いた coderabbit の指摘 3 件を確認し、Major 1 件を修正しました(8e96d83a)。

修正: internal/admin/capability_fanout.go:362 — ゼロの full_node_id も不一致として拒否(Major)

ご指摘のとおりです。mismatched-responder ガードは report.GetFullNodeId() != 0 を条件に含めていたため、自分を識別しない応答者がチェックを通過し、その capability が snapshot の期待する member のものとして記録されていました。

adapter/encryption_admin.go:372-378 を見ると、サイドカー未設定のノードは full_node_id=0 かつ storage_envelope_v2_capable=true を返します。まさに stale routing / shared address でガードが弾くべき形です。除外を落としました。

member.FullNodeID != 0 の条件は残しているので、snapshot 側が id を知らない member は従来どおり普通にプローブされます。

影響範囲について正確に記しておきます: 下流の StorageEnvelopeV2ReadyEncryptionCapable も要求し、サイドカー無しノードはこれを false で返します。したがって本件は単独で activation まで到達する穴ではなく、ガード自体を堅くする defense in depth です。とはいえ「サイドカーはあるが fullNodeID が未配線」のような形では素通りし得るため、ガードの宣言どおり fail-closed に揃えるのが妥当と判断しました。

Caller audit: probeCapability の呼び出し元は capability_fanout.go:235 の 1 箇所のみ。errCapabilityFanoutMismatchedResponder の扱いも変えていません。

Test evidence

  • 追加 TestCapabilityFanout_ZeroResponderIDFailsClosed — 応答が full_node_id=0 かつ V2 capable のとき OK=false / Reachable=false / Err != nil / StorageEnvelopeV2Ready()==false を検証。
  • 追加 TestCapabilityFanout_UnknownExpectedIDStillProbes — snapshot 側の FullNodeID が 0 の member は従来どおり Reachable=true になること(=ガードが効きすぎていないこと)を検証。
  • 修正前は前者が expected OK=false when the responder reports no full_node_id で失敗します。
  • go test -race ./internal/admin/ ./internal/encryption/... → ok
  • golangci-lint run internal/admin/... → 0 issues

残る 2 件(Minor)について

  • internal/encryption/kek/env.go:38base64.DecodeString がエラー時に部分デコード結果を返す点。
  • main_encryption_fanout.go:95 — V2 有効化ログに key_id を構造化キーとして追加。

どちらも Minor で、次の tick で対応します。なお main_encryption_confchange.go:120 の P1 スレッドは 45ef4bae で対応済みです(bot は自動 resolve しないため未解決表示のままです)。

@claude review

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claude Bot commented Aug 22, 2026

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 1m 24s —— View job


Review of 8e96d83 — treat an unset responder id as a capability mismatch

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Verify the 8e96d83a fix in internal/admin/capability_fanout.go (zero full_node_id mismatch guard)
  • Check new tests TestCapabilityFanout_ZeroResponderIDFailsClosed / TestCapabilityFanout_UnknownExpectedIDStillProbes
  • Confirm the two acknowledged-but-deferred Minor items are still open (internal/encryption/kek/env.go:38, main_encryption_fanout.go:95)
  • Post review feedback

Verdict: fix is correct

Traced probeCapability (internal/admin/capability_fanout.go:326-370) directly:

  • Before: member.FullNodeID != 0 && report.GetFullNodeId() != 0 && report.GetFullNodeId() != member.FullNodeID — a responder that omitted its id (0) always passed, regardless of what the snapshot expected.
  • After: member.FullNodeID != 0 && report.GetFullNodeId() != member.FullNodeID — dropping the report.GetFullNodeId() != 0 clause means an unidentified responder (0) now mismatches whenever the snapshot expected a specific non-zero id, which is exactly the stale-routing / shared-address case the guard exists for.
  • The member.FullNodeID != 0 clause is untouched, so TestCapabilityFanout_UnknownExpectedIDStillProbes correctly shows a member the snapshot itself can't identify still probes normally — the guard doesn't over-fire.
  • I confirmed the "defense in depth, not a standalone hole" framing in the commit message against adapter/encryption_admin.go:372-378: a sidecar-less node's GetCapability returns EncryptionCapable: false (zero value) alongside full_node_id=0, and StorageEnvelopeV2Ready() (internal/admin/capability_fanout.go:114-124) already requires EncryptionCapable for every verdict. So pre-fix, this specific responder shape couldn't reach V2 activation on its own — but the guard's own contract (reject unidentified responders under stale routing) was still broken, which is what the fix restores.
  • Checked for interaction with the separate join-time probe (probeStorageEnvelopeV2Capability / main_encryption_confchange.go:142) — that path doesn't go through CapabilityFanout/probeCapability at all, so this change has no effect on PreAddMember.
  • RouteMember.FullNodeID values are sourced from live Raft Configuration() via routeGroupFromConfiguration (main_encryption_fanout.go:180+), which derives ids deterministically from raft IDs — consistent with the commit's claim that "every correctly configured member reports a derived non-zero id."

Test coverage

Both new tests target the actual regression:

  • TestCapabilityFanout_ZeroResponderIDFailsClosed — would have failed against the pre-fix guard (a full_node_id=0 + storage_envelope_v2_capable=true responder used to pass); now asserts OK=false, Reachable=false, non-nil Err, and StorageEnvelopeV2Ready()==false.
  • TestCapabilityFanout_UnknownExpectedIDStillProbes — guards against over-tightening; confirms a member with no expected id in the snapshot still gets probed and marked reachable.

This matches the repo's "review-found defect → failing test first" convention.

Remaining items (already tracked by the author, not part of this commit)

Confirmed both are still open in the current tree, consistent with the trigger comment's plan to defer them:

  • internal/encryption/kek/env.go:33-38defer clear(raw) is registered after the decodeErr check returns, so a malformed base64 string still leaves its partially-decoded bytes uncleared on the error path.
  • main_encryption_fanout.go:94-95 (tryActivateStorageEnvelopeV2Writes) — the V2-activation slog.Info still has no key_id field identifying which active storage DEK was activated under.

Note on verification

Command execution required interactive approval that wasn't available in this session, so this is a static trace (call graph, the EncryptionCapable/StorageEnvelopeV2Ready cross-reference, and the RouteMember construction path) rather than a test run. The described evidence in the commit message (go test -race ./internal/admin/ ./internal/encryption/... → ok, golangci-lint run internal/admin/... → 0 issues) is consistent with what the code should produce; I'd suggest CI confirm before merge if it hasn't already.

Overall: the fix correctly closes the CodeRabbit Major finding with a precise, well-targeted regression test, and doesn't touch the unrelated join-time probe path.

base64.DecodeString returns the bytes it decoded before the corruption
alongside its error, so a malformed ELASTICKV_KEK left partial key
material in the buffer: the deferred clear was registered after the
error check and never ran on that path. Register it immediately after
the decode instead.

Enabling V2 storage envelope writes is a sticky, operationally
significant state change. Log the active storage DEK id under a stable
key_id attribute so an operator can tell which key the cluster
activated against.

The wipe of a local slice is not observable from a test; the kek test
gains a partial-decode input that exercises the path and asserts the
value is still rejected and unset. The activation log has a direct
assertion on the key_id attribute.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
@bootjp

bootjp commented Aug 22, 2026

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残っていた coderabbit の Minor 2 件を修正しました(21720c4c)。

1. internal/encryption/kek/env.go:38 — 部分デコードされた KEK の消去(Minor / Security)

指摘どおりです。base64.DecodeString破損位置までにデコード済みのバイト列をエラーと同時に返すため、defer clear(raw) がエラー判定のに登録されていると、不正な ELASTICKV_KEK を渡した場合に部分的な鍵素材がバッファに残ったまま return していました。clear の登録を decode 直後に移動しました。

raw, decodeErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
defer clear(raw)
unsetErr := os.Unsetenv(EnvVar)
if decodeErr != nil { ... }

clear(nil) は no-op なので、decode が完全に失敗して raw == nil のケースも安全です。

テストについて正直に書いておきます: ローカルスライスのゼロ化はテストから観測できません。TestEnvWrapperInvalidInputStillUnsets を table 化し、"not-base64"(全滅)に加えて <valid 32-byte base64> + "$$"(部分デコードが発生する入力) を追加してこの経路を通し、拒否と env unset は検証しています。ゼロ化そのものの assertion は書けていません。

2. main_encryption_fanout.go:95 — 有効化ログに key_id(Minor / Maintainability)

こちらも指摘どおりです。V2 write の有効化は sticky で運用上重要な状態遷移なので、どの active storage DEK に対して有効化したかがログから追えるべきです。既に取得している ActiveStorageKeyID() の戻り値を捨てていたので、名前を付けて slog.Uint64("key_id", ...) に渡しました。

Test evidence

  • 追加 TestStorageEnvelopeV2ActivationLogsActiveKeyIDslog の capturing handler で有効化ログのレコードを捕まえ、key_id 属性が active storage DEK id(42)と一致することを検証。
  • key_id 属性を落とすと activation log is missing the key_id attribute で FAIL することを確認済み。
  • go test -race ./internal/encryption/... → ok
  • go test -race -run TestStorageEnvelopeV2 . → ok
  • golangci-lint run . internal/encryption/... → 0 issues

main_encryption_fanout.go:76 の P1(7/19, codex)について

「bootstrap 前に sticky V2 latch が立ち得る」という指摘ですが、現 HEAD では対応済みです。tryActivateStorageEnvelopeV2Writes の先頭に ActiveStorageKeyID() の bootstrap ガードがあり、bootstrap 前は fan-out を呼ぶ前に false を返します。回帰テスト TestStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitorWaitsForBootstrap も既にあり、bootstrap 前は fan-out 呼び出し回数が 0 であることまで検証しています。


これで #1058 に届いている指摘はすべて対応済みです。なお本 PR は現在 main に対して CONFLICTING 状態です。次の tick で解消を試みます。

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 2m 0s —— View job


Review of 21720c4 — wipe partial KEK bytes and name the key on V2 activation

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Inspect commit 21720c4c diff (internal/encryption/kek/env.go, main_encryption_fanout.go)
  • Verify the clear(raw) ordering fix and its test
  • Verify the key_id structured logging fix and its test
  • Confirm the P1 bootstrap-latch claim against current HEAD
  • Check merge-conflict state vs origin/main (partially — see note)
  • Post review feedback

Verdict: both Minor findings are correctly fixed

1. internal/encryption/kek/env.go:33-44 — partial KEK wipe ordering

Traced this directly: defer clear(raw) (env.go:37) is now registered immediately after base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString, before the decodeErr != nil check. Since Go defers execute unconditionally on function return regardless of which return statement fires, raw is wiped whether decode fully succeeds, partially succeeds (corruption after some valid bytes), or fails outright. clear(nil) is a documented no-op, so the fully-failed-decode case (raw == nil) is also safe. This matches the finding exactly — the bug was that defer clear(raw) used to sit after the decodeErr != nil early return, so a malformed value never got zeroed.

TestEnvWrapperInvalidInputStillUnsets (env_test.go:35-49) is table-driven now with a genuinely new case: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{1}, fileKEKSize)) + "$$" decodes 32 valid bytes before hitting the $$ corruption, so DecodeString returns those 32 bytes alongside the error — exactly the partial-decode path the fix targets. Both cases still assert rejection and that EnvVar ends up unset. The commit message is upfront that the actual zeroing isn't observable from a black-box test (correct — there's no exported hook to peek at a stack-local slice after clear), so this test can only confirm the code path is exercised and behaves correctly otherwise. That's an honest, reasonable limit given Go's memory model.

2. main_encryption_fanout.go:82-99key_id on V2 activation log

keyID, bootstrapped := wiring.cache.ActiveStorageKeyID() now captures the ID instead of discarding it, and slog.Info(...) passes slog.Uint64("key_id", uint64(keyID)). ActiveStorageKeyID returns (uint32, bool) (internal/encryption/applier.go:262), so the uint64 cast is a plain widen, not a truncation risk. TestStorageEnvelopeV2ActivationLogsActiveKeyID (main_encryption_fanout_test.go:?) installs a capturing slog.Handler, drives tryActivateStorageEnvelopeV2Writes with a cache seeded to active-key 42, and asserts the emitted record's key_id attribute equals 42 — a real regression test that fails if the attribute is dropped or wrong, per the commit message's own verification.

One implementation detail worth double-checking for anyone touching this later: the test mutates the package-global slog.Default() via slog.SetDefault. It does not call t.Parallel(), so under Go's test scheduler it always runs to full completion before any sibling t.Parallel() test in this file actually executes concurrently (parallel tests only resume together after every top-level test in the file has been initially invoked/paused) — so there's no cross-test race here despite this file having many t.Parallel() tests elsewhere.

3. P1 bootstrap-latch claim (already resolved, not new in this commit)

Verified directly: tryActivateStorageEnvelopeV2Writes (main_encryption_fanout.go:86-89) checks wiring.cache.ActiveStorageKeyID()'s bootstrapped bool and returns false before ever calling capabilityFanout. TestStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitorWaitsForBootstrap (main_encryption_fanout_test.go:52-78) asserts both that V2 writes stay inactive and that the fan-out function is called zero times pre-bootstrap. This matches the author's claim that the codex P1 thread from 7/19 is already closed on current HEAD.

Note on verification

Command execution (go vet/go test/golangci-lint) required interactive approval not available in this session, so this review is a static trace of the diff, defer/return ordering, and cross-referencing ActiveStorageKeyID's signature — not a test run. The described evidence in the commit message (go test -race ./internal/encryption/... → ok, go test -race -run TestStorageEnvelopeV2 . → ok, golangci-lint run . internal/encryption/... → 0 issues) is consistent with what the code should produce; CI should confirm before merge if it hasn't already.

I also attempted to independently verify the "PR is CONFLICTING against main" note from the trigger comment, but this checkout only has a shallow origin/main ref (1 commit, no shared history with this branch's 46 commits) and a full git fetch requires network approval unavailable in this session — I can't confirm or refute the conflict state from here.

Summary

Both Minor findings from the latest CodeRabbit pass are correctly fixed with targeted regression tests, consistent with this repo's "review-found defect → failing test first" convention. No new issues found in this commit.

@bootjp

bootjp commented Aug 24, 2026

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本 PR で未解決のまま残っているスレッドは 1 件のみmain_encryption_confchange.go:120 の P1 — Skip V2 probing when encryption is not configured)ですが、これは 45ef4bae で対応済みです。 bot は自動 resolve しないため未解決表示のままになっています。

新規コミットはありません。 「stale と判断した根拠」を求められているので、現 HEAD (21720c4c) のコードを全経路辿った結果を示します。

指摘の内容

run() still constructs this interceptor because encWiring.cache is defaulted and the default group store exists ... gate interceptor construction or this probe on encryption being configured rather than just on the cache existing.

**「cache の存在ではなく encryption が設定されているかで判定せよ」**という指摘でした。

現 HEAD での検証

1. 構築自体が gate されていますmain_encryption_confchange.go:68-81):

func newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor(
	encryptionConfigured bool,
	...
) raftadmin.MembershipChangeInterceptor {
	if !encryptionConfigured {
		return nil
	}
	return newEncryptionPreRegister(...)
}

2. 判定は cache ではなく cipher ですmain_encryption_write_wiring.go:142-144):

func (w encryptionWriteWiring) encryptionConfigured() bool {
	return w.cipher != nil
}

ご指摘のとおり cache は常に defaulted されるので判定に使えませんcipher は encryption が実際に設定されたときにのみ非 nil になります。

3. 呼び出し側が渡していますmain.go:576-578):

encryptionConfChangeInterceptor := newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor(
	encWiring.encryptionConfigured(),
	coordinate, shardGroups[cfg.defaultGroup], encWiring.cache, ...)

4. nil が実際に probe を無効化しますinternal/raftadmin/server.go:96, 115):

if s.interceptor != nil {

AddVoter / AddLearner の両経路で nil のとき pre-step ごとスキップされます。

回帰テスト

main_encryption_confchange_test.go:341-361 が 3 ケースを固定しています:

  • encryptionConfigured=falsenil(非暗号化デプロイで inert)
  • encryptionConfigured=true非 nil
  • 依存が nil のとき → nil(既存の nil ガードも維持)

さらに TestEncryptionWriteWiringEncryptionConfigured:362-)が **「cache は常に populated なので判定要因にしてはならない」**ことを明示的に assert しています。これは指摘の核心そのものです。

go test -race -run 'ConfChange|Interceptor' .ok

まとめ

指摘は当時正しく、45ef4bae で修正済みです。本スレッドは resolve していただいて問題ありません。 これで #1058 の未解決指摘は 0 件になります。

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claude Bot commented Aug 24, 2026

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 1m 12s —— View job


Review of the staleness claim for main_encryption_confchange.go:120 (Skip V2 probing when encryption is not configured)

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Verify newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor gating in main_encryption_confchange.go
  • Verify encryptionConfigured() in main_encryption_write_wiring.go
  • Verify call site in main.go
  • Verify nil-interceptor handling in internal/raftadmin/server.go
  • Verify regression tests
  • Post final verdict

Verdict: confirmed stale — resolve the thread

I independently traced the full path on current HEAD (21720c4, same as cited) without relying on the commit message:

  • Construction is gated, not just cache-existence: newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor (main_encryption_confchange.go:68-81) takes encryptionConfigured bool as its first parameter and does if !encryptionConfigured { return nil } before ever touching newEncryptionPreRegister.
  • The gate is cipher-based, not cache-based: encryptionWriteWiring.encryptionConfigured() (main_encryption_write_wiring.go:142-144) is return w.cipher != nil. I confirmed the root cause independently — buildEncryptionWriteWiring (main_encryption_write_wiring.go:254) does w := encryptionWriteWiring{cache: encryption.NewStateCache()} as its very first line, unconditionally, before any encryption-enabled check. So cache is always non-nil regardless of configuration, which is exactly why the pre-fix gate (cache + default-group existence) was insufficient and why cipher (only set when encryption is actually wired) is the correct signal.
  • Call site passes the new signal: main.go:576-578 calls newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor(encWiring.encryptionConfigured(), coordinate, shardGroups[cfg.defaultGroup], encWiring.cache, *encryptionSidecarPath, etcdraftengine.DeriveNodeID).
  • return nil is a true nil interface: the function's return type is raftadmin.MembershipChangeInterceptor and the literal return nil at line 78 produces a genuine nil interface value (not a nil-valued concrete type boxed in an interface), so downstream != nil checks behave correctly.
  • The nil interceptor actually skips the probe: internal/raftadmin/server.go:96 (AddVoter) and :115 (AddLearner) both guard PreAddMember behind if s.interceptor != nil. On an unconfigured cluster, newEncryptionConfChangeInterceptor returns nil, so this pre-step — including the V2 capability probe that was rejecting membership changes on plain clusters — is skipped entirely, restoring pre-7c behavior.
  • Regression tests exist and target exactly this bug: TestNewEncryptionConfChangeInterceptorGatedOnEncryptionConfigured (main_encryption_confchange_test.go:334-361) asserts all three branches (false→nil, true→non-nil, true with missing deps→nil, preserving the original nil guards). TestEncryptionWriteWiringEncryptionConfigured (:363-379) explicitly pins down the root cause: a wiring with only a defaulted cache (encryptionWriteWiring{cache: encryption.NewStateCache()}) must not report configured — this is the exact scenario that broke unencrypted clusters pre-fix. Both test helpers (stubDeriveNodeID, allowStorageEnvelopeV2Capability) exist and are correctly referenced, so the tests compile.

This matches the author's analysis point for point. The P1 finding was accurately fixed in 45ef4bae and is stale on current HEAD.

Note on verification

Test/lint execution required interactive approval not available in this session (same limitation as prior automated reviews on this PR) — this is a static trace of the call graph, nil-interface semantics, and field-initialization order in buildEncryptionWriteWiring, not a live test run. The trace is unambiguous and I found no gap in the reasoning; CI's go test -race -run 'ConfChange|Interceptor' . result should be treated as authoritative confirmation.

Summary

The remaining unresolved thread on main_encryption_confchange.go:120 is stale — the fix landed in 45ef4bae and is correctly covered by regression tests. No other open findings remain on this PR as of 21720c4. Safe to resolve the thread.

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Reviewed commit: 21720c4c97

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// change.
_ = req
if err := s.requireLeader(ctx); err != nil {
if err := s.requireRecoveryLeader(ctx); err != nil {

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P1 Badge Wait for default-group apply before serving resync

When the default-group leader has committed a newer writer registration but its FSM is still applying it, this check succeeds and the following registry read can return the older last_seen_local_epoch, causing a recovering caller with a rolled-back sidecar to select an epoch that is too low. Fresh evidence beyond the earlier leadership-wiring issue is that the production Engine.VerifyLeader implementation calls submitRead(ctx, false), and handleReadStates completes such requests immediately without waiting for applied >= ReadIndex; using the default-group view therefore confirms leadership but not freshness. Use a linearizable/read-applied barrier before projecting the sidecar and registry state.

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Comment thread main.go Outdated
enableMutators := encryptionMutatorsEnabled()
enableMutators := encryptionMutatorsEnabled(kekConfigured)
encryptionCapabilityFanout := buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout(ctx, eg, runtimes, enableMutators)
startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor(ctx, eg, encryptionCapabilityFanout, encWiring)

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P2 Badge Avoid retaining an all-to-all capability connection mesh

In a multi-node encrypted cluster, every node starts this monitor and its first successful fan-out calls ConnFor for every unique member through that node's private GRPCConnCache. The monitor then exits, but buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout closes the cache only when the process context is canceled, so an N-node cluster permanently retains roughly N² gRPC connections after V2 activation even though probing has finished. Close or separate the monitor's connections when it succeeds, or coordinate the probe so it does not establish a process-lifetime full mesh.

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requireRecoveryLeader confirmed leadership and nothing else.
Engine.VerifyLeader submits its ReadIndex with waitApplied=false, and
handleReadStates completes such a request the moment the index is known
-- it never waits for this node's FSM to reach it. A leader that had
committed a newer writer registration but not yet applied it therefore
passed the check, and the registry read in ResyncSidecar returned the
older last_seen_local_epoch. A recovering caller with a rolled-back
sidecar would then choose an epoch that is too low.

LeaderView.LinearizableRead is documented to block until the returned
index is safe to read from the local FSM, which is exactly the barrier
this projection needs, so the recovery gate now takes it after the
leadership check.

Scoped to the recovery path. requireRecoveryLeader has one caller,
ResyncSidecar, and the other mutator RPCs keep their VerifyLeader-only
posture through requireEncryptionLeader; adding a round-trip to all of
them was not warranted by this finding.

The leader-view stub gained a call counter and an injectable error
because its LinearizableRead previously returned (0, nil) unconditionally
and could not tell the two postures apart. The tests assert both that the
barrier is taken and that a barrier failure fails the RPC closed rather
than serving a projection from a possibly-behind FSM.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
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bootjp commented Aug 24, 2026

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HEAD (21720c4c) 一致の P1(adapter/encryption_admin.go:450 — Wait for default-group apply before serving resync)を修正しました(c65ed5f9)。指摘は正しく、主張されていた実装の詳細も全て裏取りできました。

検証

ご指摘の 2 点をコードで確認しました:

1. VerifyLeaderwaitApplied=false で submit するinternal/raftengine/etcd/engine.go):

func (e *Engine) VerifyLeader(ctx context.Context) error {
	_, err := e.submitRead(ctx, false)   // ← false
	return err
}

2. handleReadStates は待たずに完了させる:

req.target = state.Index
if !req.waitApplied {
	e.popPendingRead(id)
	req.done <- readResult{index: state.Index}   // ← applied >= ReadIndex を待たない
	continue
}

したがって VerifyLeader は quorum によるリーダーシップは確認するが、このノードの FSM がその index まで適用したことは保証しません。新しい writer registration を commit 済みだが未適用のリーダーがチェックを通過し、続く registry 読み取りが古い last_seen_local_epoch を返します。ご指摘のとおり、sidecar をロールバックした復旧側が低すぎる epoch を選ぶことになります。

LinearizableReadsubmitRead(ctx, true) で、LeaderView インタフェースにも 「blocks until the returned index is safe to read from the local FSM on that node」 と明記されています。まさに必要なバリアです。

修正

requireRecoveryLeader でリーダーシップ確認の後に LinearizableRead を取ります。

スコープは復旧経路に限定しました。 requireRecoveryLeader の呼び出し元は ResyncSidecar:450)の 1 箇所のみで(grep 済み)、他の mutator RPC は requireEncryptionLeader 経由で従来どおり VerifyLeader のみです。本指摘は復旧時の projection の鮮度に関するものなので、全 RPC にラウンドトリップを追加する根拠はないと判断しました。

Caller audit

関数 呼び出し元 変更
requireRecoveryLeader ResyncSidecar のみ バリア追加
requireEncryptionLeader :1934, :1942 変更なし

Test evidence

テストダブルを先に直す必要がありました。 stubLeaderView.LinearizableRead は無条件に (0, nil) を返しており、バリアの有無を区別できませんでした。呼び出しカウンタとエラー注入を追加しています。

  • TestEncryptionAdmin_ResyncSidecar_TakesReadAppliedBarrier — バリアが実際に呼ばれること
  • TestEncryptionAdmin_ResyncSidecar_FailsClosedWhenBarrierFails — バリア失敗時に RPC が fail-closed すること(遅れている FSM から projection を返さない)

バリアを外すと 2 本とも FAIL することを確認済みです。

検証状況

  • go test -race ./internal/encryption/... . → ok
  • golangci-lint run adapter/... → 0 issues
  • ./adapter/ フル実行はバックグラウンド継続中。次の tick で報告します。

残り

main.go:2657 の P2(capability monitor が N² の gRPC 接続をプロセス寿命で保持)は未対応です。次の tick で検証します。

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Keep them coming!

Reviewed commit: c65ed5f984

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bootjp enabled auto-merge August 28, 2026 08:25
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bootjp commented Aug 28, 2026

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Current HEAD has no review verdict from both bots yet (the last codex/claude pass on this PR predates it, or hit usage limits). No open at-HEAD findings on my side.

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 2m 26s —— View job


Review of current HEAD c65ed5f9 — read-applied barrier before serving resync

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Check current HEAD and diff vs origin/main
  • Verify the last fix commit (c65ed5f9)
  • Check for any other unaddressed findings at current HEAD
  • Check CI status
  • Post final review verdict

Verdict: c65ed5f9 is correct; no new at-HEAD issues found

I independently traced this without relying on the commit message:

  • The root-cause claim checks out against production code. Engine.VerifyLeader (internal/raftengine/etcd/engine.go:1085-1088) calls e.submitRead(ctx, false). handleReadStates (:3585) completes a pending read as soon as the ReadIndex is known when !req.waitApplied — it does not wait for this node's FSM to reach that index. So requireEncryptionLeader alone (leader-state + VerifyLeader) confirms quorum leadership but not that the local FSM has applied the latest committed writer registration.
  • The fix is the right primitive. LeaderView.LinearizableRead (internal/raftengine/engine.go:152-158, implemented via submitRead(ctx, true)) is documented to block until the returned index is safe to read from the local FSM — exactly the barrier ResyncSidecar's registry projection needs.
  • Wiring in requireRecoveryLeader (adapter/encryption_admin.go:1937-1966) is correct: it runs requireEncryptionLeader first (fast-path + VerifyLeader), then, only if a view is configured, calls view.LinearizableRead(ctx) and maps a failure through the existing verifyLeaderErrorToStatus (so timeouts/cancellation still map to DeadlineExceeded/Canceled rather than a misleading FailedPrecondition).
  • Scope is correctly limited. requireRecoveryLeader has exactly one caller (ResyncSidecar); all other mutator RPCs still go through requireEncryptionLeader/requireLeader with the original VerifyLeader-only posture, matching the stated intent of not adding a second round-trip to paths this finding didn't implicate.
  • Test double was actually broken before this commitstubLeaderView.LinearizableRead unconditionally returned (0, nil), so no prior test could distinguish "barrier taken" from "barrier skipped." The new linearizableCalls/linearizableErr fields fix that, and the two new tests are genuine regression tests: TestEncryptionAdmin_ResyncSidecar_TakesReadAppliedBarrier asserts the call actually happens, TestEncryptionAdmin_ResyncSidecar_FailsClosedWhenBarrierFails asserts a barrier failure fails the RPC rather than serving a projection off a possibly-behind FSM. Both would fail against the pre-fix code path.
  • CI is green on this exact commit: all three checks (PR #1058, Test, Jepsen Test) passed on c65ed5f9 (run 32788421083 et al.), consistent with the static trace.

I also re-verified the prior fixes on this branch are still intact at HEAD and don't interact badly with each other: the V2-probe encryption-configured gate (45ef4ba), the deferred decompression split (748b078), the zero-full_node_id mismatch guard (8e96d83), and the KEK-wipe/key_id logging fix (21720c4) are all still in place and unrelated to each other's code paths (different files, no shared call graph beyond encryptionWriteWiring, which itself is untouched by this commit).

One pre-existing, still-open, non-blocking item (not part of this commit)

Codex's P2 from the 21720c4c review — "Avoid retaining an all-to-all capability connection mesh" (main.go:2657 / main_encryption_fanout.go:37-48) — remains unaddressed. buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout's fanoutConnCache is shared for the whole process lifetime and only closed on ctx.Done(), so after startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor succeeds once, an N-node encrypted cluster keeps ~N² idle gRPC connections open for the rest of the process's life. This is a resource-retention/efficiency concern, not a correctness bug, and doesn't block this PR's stated scope (writer-registry projection), but it's worth tracking separately since it wasn't marked "Fixed in ..." in the thread history the way the other findings were.

Note on verification

Command execution in this session required interactive approval that wasn't available (same limitation noted in every prior automated pass on this PR), so this is a static trace of the diff, the submitRead/handleReadStates control flow, and the requireRecoveryLeader/requireEncryptionLeader call graph — not a local test run. I cross-checked against the CI results for this exact commit instead, which are green.

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💡 Codex Review

Here are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.

Reviewed commit: c65ed5f984

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Comment on lines +84 to +87
secret, err := w.logical.WriteWithContext(ctx, w.mount+"/encrypt/"+w.keyName, map[string]interface{}{
"plaintext": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(dek),
"associated_data": vaultTransitAAD,
})

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P2 Badge Disable Transit upsert in the encrypt request

If the Vault key is deleted or disabled between the metadata read and this encrypt call, Vault Transit's default upsert behavior can create a replacement key, allowing the new DEK to be wrapped under unintended key material despite the preceding existence check. Persisting that ciphertext can make previously wrapped DEKs inaccessible after restart; pass disable_upsert=true in the encrypt request so the operation fails closed without this read/write race.

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Vault Transit's encrypt endpoint creates the named key when it is missing.
The key existence read that precedes the encrypt cannot close that window:
a key deleted or disabled between the two calls is silently replaced, this
DEK is wrapped under the new key material, and every DEK already wrapped
under the old key stops unwrapping after a restart.

Send disable_upsert so the encrypt fails closed instead.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
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bootjp commented Aug 28, 2026

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internal/encryption/kek/vault.go:87 (P2, "Disable Transit upsert in the encrypt request") — fixed in 3b57fbe5.

Verified before changing anything. Wrap reads <mount>/keys/<name> to prove the key exists, then writes <mount>/encrypt/<name> with only plaintext and associated_data. Transit's encrypt endpoint upserts a missing key by default, so the read cannot close the window between the two calls: a key deleted or disabled in between is silently replaced, this DEK gets wrapped under the new material, and every DEK already wrapped under the old key stops unwrapping after a restart. Sending disable_upsert: true makes the encrypt fail closed instead, which is the right outcome — a wrap that cannot use the intended key must not succeed.

Test: TestVaultTransitWrapperRequestBinding now asserts the flag is on the encrypt request. Revert-checked — it fails without it. go test -race ./internal/encryption/kek/ green; golangci-lint run ./internal/encryption/... → 0 issues.


One item on this PR that I am not fixing here, with reasons, since the last review round raised it: Codex's P2 from the 21720c4c round, "Avoid retaining an all-to-all capability connection mesh" (main.go:2657 / main_encryption_fanout.go:37-48).

  • It is stale by the HEAD rule (original_commit_id is 21720c4c, HEAD is c65ed5f9), and I checked the substance rather than stopping at the rule: buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout creates one kv.GRPCConnCache and closes it only on ctx.Done(), and startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor retries the fan-out every 5s until it succeeds, so each mutator-enabled node does end up holding a connection to every voter and learner for the process lifetime. The claim is accurate.
  • It is not this PR's code. main_encryption_fanout.go is on origin/main (last touched by 664d8f99), and this branch's scope is the sidecar writer-registry projection. The same cache is what the operator-triggered EnableStorageEnvelope cutover dials through, so shrinking its lifetime is a decision about that RPC's behaviour, not about this change.

Tracking it as a follow-up against main rather than widening this PR.

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 3m 15s —— View job


Review of 3b57fbe5 — refuse Transit key upsert when wrapping a DEK

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Check current HEAD vs origin/main
  • Verify the 3b57fbe5 fix in internal/encryption/kek/vault.go
  • Check the new/updated test
  • Independently assess the "not fixing" rationale for the N² connection mesh item
  • Check for any other unaddressed findings at current HEAD
  • Post final review verdict

3b57fbe5 — one thing to verify before treating this as closed

The mechanics of the fix are exactly as described: Wrap (internal/encryption/kek/vault.go:84-94) now adds "disable_upsert": true to the /encrypt/:name request body, after the existing /keys/:name existence read. The window between read and write is real — Transit's own docs describe the encrypt endpoint upserting a missing key, so a key deleted/disabled between the two calls previously got silently recreated, and the DEK would be wrapped under the new material while every DEK wrapped under the old key would fail to unwrap after restart. TestVaultTransitWrapperRequestBinding (vault_test.go:56-61) pins the field onto the outgoing request map, and I confirmed it does regress without the change (the test literally asserts on logical.data["disable_upsert"]).

What I can't verify in this session, and think is worth double-checking before calling the thread closed: disable_upsert needs to be a field Vault's server-side Transit encrypt handler actually reads. vaultapi.Logical.WriteWithContext (the interface this code calls through, vault.go:17) is a generic passthrough that JSON-marshals whatever map you give it — the Go client does no field validation, and neither does the fake logical used in the unit test. So the test can only prove the client sends the field; it can't prove Vault's Transit backend honors it. If the field name doesn't match what the server expects, Vault's request framework will most likely just ignore the unknown key rather than error, and the upsert race this commit is meant to close would still exist — silently, since nothing here would fail.

I don't have web access in this session to check https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/secret/transit#encrypt-data against the Vault version pinned in go.mod (github.com/hashicorp/vault/api v1.23.0), so I can't confirm or refute the field name myself. The angle I'd suggest checking specifically: Vault's documented mechanism for preventing encrypt-time key upsert has historically been ACL-based (denying the create capability on the encrypt path so Vault's policy engine itself rejects the implicit key creation), rather than a request-body flag — if that's still the case for the pinned client version, this fix may be a no-op that adds a well-intentioned comment and a test that only checks the wire shape, not actual behavior. Worth a quick check against a real Vault instance (or the API reference) before treating this as closing the race; if disable_upsert isn't real, the ACL-based mitigation would need to go in deployment docs instead.

To be clear, everything else about this commit is sound: the caller audit (single caller, Wrap), the ordering (comment placed correctly, field added to the same request as plaintext/associated_data), and the regression test's mechanics all check out.

N² capability connection mesh — agree this is out of scope

Verified independently rather than taking the claim at face value: buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout and its single process-lifetime fanoutConnCache (closed only on ctx.Done()) already exist byte-for-byte on origin/main (confirmed via git show origin/main:main_encryption_fanout.go), so the retained-connections behavior itself predates this PR and isn't something this diff introduces.

One nuance worth naming, though it doesn't change the conclusion: this PR's new startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor (main_encryption_fanout.go:53-90, added by this branch) now calls that fan-out proactively at startup and retries every 5s until success — so on an encrypted, mutator-enabled cluster the full N² mesh now gets built automatically as a side effect of normal startup, where previously it only got built lazily when an operator issued the EnableStorageEnvelope RPC. The underlying resource-retention bug is inherited, but this PR does make it fire unconditionally rather than on-demand. Given the fix is scoped to a pre-existing helper shared by an unrelated RPC, deferring it to a follow-up against main (as stated) is a reasonable call — just worth noting in that follow-up that this branch changed the trigger frequency, not only inheriting the code.

Other findings at current HEAD

Checked the full outstanding-comment history through c65ed5f9/21720c4c/8e96d83/748b078/45ef4ba — all were previously verified fixed in earlier passes on this thread and nothing has regressed them. No new findings surfaced outside the two items above. CI (PR #1058, Test, Jepsen Test) was still in progress at the time of this review; recommend confirming green before merge.
· branch design/encryption-stage7-projection

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Keep it up!

Reviewed commit: 3b57fbe5de

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🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
main_encryption_fanout_test.go (1)

222-223: 📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick win

slog.Handler のコンテキストを保持してください。

WithAttrsWithGroup は、Go 1.26 の契約に従って属性とグループ名を含む新しいハンドラを返してください。現在の実装は両方を破棄するため、Logger.With または Logger.WithGroup を使用するテストで構造化コンテキストが失われます。

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minimal, and validate.

In `@main_encryption_fanout_test.go` around lines 222 - 223, Update
capturingLogHandler.WithAttrs and capturingLogHandler.WithGroup to return
handlers retaining the accumulated attributes and group context, rather than
returning the unchanged receiver; ensure Logger.With and Logger.WithGroup
preserve their structured context in tests while maintaining existing log
capture behavior.
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Nitpick comments:
In `@main_encryption_fanout_test.go`:
- Around line 222-223: Update capturingLogHandler.WithAttrs and
capturingLogHandler.WithGroup to return handlers retaining the accumulated
attributes and group context, rather than returning the unchanged receiver;
ensure Logger.With and Logger.WithGroup preserve their structured context in
tests while maintaining existing log capture behavior.

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📒 Files selected for processing (8)
  • adapter/encryption_admin.go
  • adapter/encryption_admin_test.go
  • internal/encryption/kek/env.go
  • internal/encryption/kek/env_test.go
  • internal/encryption/kek/vault.go
  • internal/encryption/kek/vault_test.go
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The startup V2 capability monitor fanned out through the same connection
cache the EnableStorageEnvelope cutover keeps for the process lifetime. The
cache itself predates this branch, but the monitor is new and runs
unconditionally at startup, so an encrypted mutator-enabled cluster now
built the whole all-to-all mesh as a side effect of booting -- one idle
connection per peer on every node, held for the life of the process, for a
probe that finishes as soon as V2 writes activate.

Give the monitor its own cache and close it when the monitor stops. The
cutover keeps its own and dials when an operator actually calls it.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013rNHooj7NF3giihWVba8QE
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bootjp commented Aug 28, 2026

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Thanks for the nuance on the connection mesh — it changed my answer, so I fixed it rather than deferring: 9a1fc809.

You are right that the code is inherited but the trigger is this branch's. startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor is new here and runs unconditionally at startup, retrying every 5s until activation, so on an encrypted mutator-enabled cluster ordinary boot now builds the full all-to-all mesh that previously only appeared when an operator issued EnableStorageEnvelope. That part is this PR's to own.

Fix: buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout gives the monitor its own kv.GRPCConnCache, and the monitor closes it when it stops — on activation or on shutdown. The cutover keeps its own process-lifetime cache and dials when it is actually called, so the RPC's behaviour is unchanged. GRPCConnCache.Close clears its map rather than poisoning the cache, so a later reuse simply re-dials; the two caches are independent either way.

Tests: TestStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitorReleasesConnectionsOnActivation (release runs once the monitor exits) and TestStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanoutOwnsItsConnections (fan-out and release exist together, and both are absent when mutators are off). Revert-checked — dropping the defer fails the first one. A close failure is logged rather than returned, so a stuck connection cannot turn a successful activation into a startup failure.

go test -race . ./internal/encryption/... green (root 21s, encryption 51s); golangci-lint run ./ → 0 issues.

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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 1m 32s —— View job


Review of 9a1fc80 — release the capability monitor's connections

  • Read trigger comment and understand the request
  • Check current HEAD / git log for 9a1fc809
  • Inspect main_encryption_fanout.go diff (buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout, connection release on stop)
  • Verify the new tests
  • Check for interaction with the cutover's own connection cache
  • Post final review verdict

Verdict: fix is correct and cleanly scoped

Traced this independently rather than taking the commit message at face value:

  • The two fan-outs are now fully independent caches. buildEncryptionCapabilityFanout (main_encryption_fanout.go:37-50) still owns its own kv.GRPCConnCache, held for the process lifetime and closed only on ctx.Done() — this is the EnableStorageEnvelope cutover path, and I confirmed it's still wired unchanged at main.go:2733 (registerEncryptionAdminServer(..., encryptionCapabilityFanout, ...)), so operator-triggered cutover behavior is untouched.
  • buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout (main_encryption_fanout.go:64-73) builds a second, brand-new kv.GRPCConnCache scoped only to the startup monitor, and returns connCache.Close as the release closure. main.go:2657-2658 wires this separately: monitorFanout, releaseMonitorConns := buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout(runtimes, enableMutators) then startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor(ctx, eg, monitorFanout, releaseMonitorConns, encWiring). No shared state between the two caches.
  • Release actually fires exactly once, at the right time. startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor's goroutine (:92-107) does defer releaseCapabilityMonitorConns(release) as its first statement, so the monitor's connections are dropped whether the loop exits via ctx.Done() (shutdown) or via tryActivateStorageEnvelopeV2Writes returning true (activation) — both paths return out of the same eg.Go closure, so the deferred release always runs.
  • A close failure can't turn a successful activation into a startup failure: releaseCapabilityMonitorConns (:110-122) logs via slog.Warn rather than propagating the error into the errgroup, which is the right call since errgroup.Wait() failing here would be surprising given the monitor's own job (activation) already succeeded.
  • kv.GRPCConnCache.Close() (kv/grpc_conn_cache.go:92-108) swaps c.conns to nil under lock and closes each connection, returning the first error — it doesn't poison the cache for reuse (cachedConn/storeConn both lazily re-make the map), consistent with the commit message's claim that "the cutover dials again if it is ever used" — though in this design the monitor's cache is simply discarded after use, never reused.
  • Guard consistency: when enableMutators is false, buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout returns (nil, nil) — no cache is even allocated, so there's nothing to leak, and startStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitor's existing nil-checks correctly skip starting the goroutine in that case too.

Test coverage

Both new tests target the actual regression, not just the refactor:

  • TestStorageEnvelopeV2CapabilityMonitorReleasesConnectionsOnActivation drives the monitor to activation via a stub fan-out, eg.Wait()s (which cannot return before the goroutine's deferred release runs — deterministic, no race/sleep-based flakiness), then asserts the release channel was closed. This would fail against the pre-fix code, which had no release parameter at all.
  • TestStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanoutOwnsItsConnections checks both branches of buildStorageEnvelopeV2MonitorFanout: mutators-enabled produces a non-nil fn/release pair, mutators-disabled produces (nil, nil).
  • The two pre-existing tests (...ActivatesOnce, ...WaitsForBootstrap) were mechanically updated to pass nil for the new release parameter, and releaseCapabilityMonitorConns correctly no-ops on nil, so they remain valid without asserting on release behavior themselves.

All imports needed for the new tests (sync/atomic, errgroup, admin, encryption) are already present in main_encryption_fanout_test.go, so this should compile cleanly.

Note on verification

Command execution (go build/go vet/go test/golangci-lint) required interactive approval that wasn't available in this session — same limitation noted throughout this PR's review history. This is a static trace of the diff, the two connection-cache lifecycles, and the errgroup/defer ordering, not a live test run. The described evidence in the trigger comment (go test -race . ./internal/encryption/... green, golangci-lint run ./ → 0 issues) is consistent with what the code should produce; I'd suggest CI confirm before merge if it hasn't already.

Summary

This closes out the previously-deferred P2 connection-mesh finding cleanly: the monitor and the cutover RPC now have fully independent connection lifecycles, the monitor's connections are released deterministically on both its exit paths, and the regression is locked down by a test that would fail without the fix — consistent with this repo's review-fix convention. No new issues found in this commit.
· branch design/encryption-stage7-projection

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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. 🚀

Reviewed commit: 9a1fc80931

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