Fix policy validation & improve speed - #261
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PR 1 — security
## fix(policy,wildcard): bound wildcard matching and close two Deny-dropping paths
Three independent correctness bugs on the authorization path. No API changes.
### 1. `wildcard.Match` was exponential in the number of `*`
`deepMatchRune` recursed on both alternatives at every `*`, so its cost grew exponentially with the star count. The pattern is
caller-supplied — statement validation classifies every action against every namespace, and `Resource.Match` runs untrusted
patterns — so a tiny document could consume unbounded CPU:
| input | before | after |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------ |
| `ParseConfig`, action `"*********x"` | 59.3 s | < 1 ms |
| `ParseBucketPolicyConfig`, same action | 18.8 s | < 1 ms |
| `AdminAction.IsValid`, 8 stars | 4.5 s | < 1 ms |
Scaling was ~4x per added star: 6 stars 165 ms, 8 stars 4.5 s, 10 stars > 100 s. `MatchSimple` was equally affected, and it
backs bucket-policy principal matching and CORS origin matching.
Replaced with the standard greedy two-pointer matcher: one backtrack point, no recursion, no allocation, O(n*m) worst case.
`MatchSimple`'s documented "a trailing `?` is optional" behaviour does not survive greedy backtracking — a first attempt that
folded it into the matcher diverged on `MatchSimple("*?*a", "a")`. It is now expressed explicitly in `MatchSimple`: if the
pattern does not match outright, any prefix of it ending at a `?` that consumes the whole name also matches. The matcher itself
is now plain glob semantics with no mode flag.
### 2. `Statement.hash` omitted `NotResources`
`dropDuplicateStatements` switches to hashing above 10 statements. Two statements differing *only* in `NotResource` hashed
identically, so one was discarded at parse time. When those are `Deny` statements, a restriction silently disappears from a
policy that was written correctly.
Reproduced: an 11-statement policy carrying two distinct `Deny ... NotResource` statements loses one; the same policy with 4
statements (below the threshold, exact-comparison path) keeps both.
### 3. `HasDenyStatement` trusted a field that struct-literal policies never set
`hasDeny` is only assigned in `updateActionIndex`, which runs from `UnmarshalJSON` and `MergePolicies`. A `Policy` built as a
struct literal never reaches it — including this package's own `readonly` and `consolereadonly` defaults in `constants.go`,
both of which carry `Deny admin:CreateUser`. `HasDenyStatement()` reported `false` for them.
That matters to callers that use the answer to route policies: AIStor sorts them into a "no deny statements" bucket, evaluates
that bucket with an early return on the first `Allow`, and never reaches the `Deny`. A principal holding `readonly` plus any
policy allowing `admin:CreateUser` was granted `admin:CreateUser`.
`HasDenyStatement` now falls back to scanning statements. It runs once per policy per merge, not per request.
### Compatibility
Fix 2 changes which statements survive parsing. A policy that was accidentally relying on the collapse regains a `Deny`, so a
request that previously succeeded may start returning 403. That is the intended direction, but it belongs in release notes.
Fixes 1 and 3 are behaviour-preserving for any correctly-built input.
### Testing
- `wildcard/match_equivalence_test.go` keeps the previous recursive matcher as a reference implementation and diffs against it:
254,512 exhaustive pattern/name/mode combinations (patterns over `{a,b,*,?}` to length 5, `{a,:,/}` names) plus a
differential fuzz target. 101M fuzz executions, no divergence.
- `TestMatchStarsAreLinear` fails if a single `Match` with 8/16/64/256 stars, or 32 interleaved `*a` pairs, exceeds 50 ms.
- `policy/parse_dos_test.go` asserts `ParseConfig` and `ParseBucketPolicyConfig` stay under 2 s for star-heavy actions.
- `TestDropDuplicateStatementsKeepsNotResources` covers both the exact-comparison and hashed paths.
- `TestHasDenyStatementOnStructLiteralPolicy` walks the built-in defaults.
`go test ./...` is green.
PR 2 — performance
## perf(policy): cut authorization cost for large policy collections
A production profile of a 24-node cluster found 61–73% of all CPU on client-facing nodes inside `Policy.Decide`, and 51–61% in
`AdminAction.IsValid` alone. The credential resolved to more than 4000 policies. Six changes, no API changes, no behaviour
changes.
### `AdminAction.IsValid` / `HasResource` — O(1) fast path
Both scanned their whole action map calling `wildcard.Match` per entry, with the receiver as the pattern. `Statement.isAdmin`
calls `IsValid` for every action of every statement it evaluates, so a pure-S3 statement paid `len(Actions) x 101` wildcard
matches to learn nothing.
Now: exact map lookup; then bail if the pattern holds no metacharacter (a literal can only match by being in the map); then
bail if the literal head before the first metacharacter is prefix-incompatible with `admin:`.
| | before | after |
| ---------------------- | ------- | ------- |
| `isAdmin`, 1 action | 690 ns | 34.9 ns |
| `isAdmin`, 3 actions | 2012 ns | 63.9 ns |
The head comparison is bidirectional on purpose: `adm*` and `a*d*m*i*n*` are both valid admin patterns, so a plain
`strings.HasPrefix(head, "admin:")` would be a silent authorization change.
### `actionStatementIndex` was a pessimisation
`Decide` consulted the index and then — hit or miss — fell through to an unconditional walk of every statement, re-evaluating
everything the index had just evaluated. The index only ever helped when an indexed statement allowed. The walk now skips the
positions the index already tried (`indexes` is ascending, and `isAllowedFor` is pure).
### One classification pass instead of five, cached at parse time
`IsAllowedPtr` called `isTable`, `isKMS`, `isSTS`, `isAdmin` and `hasAdminResource`, each ranging over the action set
separately — four map-iterator setups per statement per authorization. Collapsed into one `classify()` pass, and cached on the
statement by `updateActionIndex`.
The cached field's zero value means "not computed — derive it now", not "no namespace". A statement built as a struct literal,
or cloned, is therefore slower rather than wrong, and `Statement.Clone` deliberately does not copy it. `classify` is a pure
function of `Statement.Actions`, which nothing mutates after parse — the same invariant `actionStatementIndex` already relies
on.
### The request resource string is built once per request
`IsAllowedPtr` rendered `BucketName`/`ObjectName` into a pooled buffer and then called `Buffer.String()` — which copies — once
or twice *per statement*. A memory profile of one authorization over 156 policies of 20 statements put 92.5% of all allocations
on that one line: 1561 allocations and 75 KB of garbage per authorization.
It depends only on the request, so it is now memoized on `Args` and passed to every statement. `Args` carries the fields it was
built from, so a caller reusing an `Args` for a second object cannot read a stale value.
Note: one `*Args` must not be shared across goroutines within a single evaluation. `IsAllowedPar` did share one; it now gives
each worker its own copy.
### Measured
`go test ./policy/ -run XXX -bench 'BenchmarkIsAllowed|BenchmarkSerialEvalVsParEval' -benchmem`, on an idle 32-thread box:
| benchmark | before | after | |
| ------------------------------------ | -------- | -------- | ----- |
| `IsAllowed/SingleStatementAllow` | 1811 ns | 127 ns | 14.3x |
| `IsAllowed/DenyRule` | 2737 ns | 224 ns | 12.2x |
| `IsAllowed/WildcardMatching` | 919 ns | 121 ns | 7.6x |
| `IsAllowed/MultipleStatements` | 6054 ns | 4069 ns | 1.5x |
| `SerialEvalVsParEval/128p` serial | 1.62 ms | 252 us | 6.4x |
| `SerialEvalVsParEval/1024p` serial | 12.6 ms | 2.07 ms | 6.1x |
`MultipleStatements` gains least because its statements have non-matching action sets, so `Actions.Match` short-circuits before
classification runs. `SerialEvalVsParEval` builds policies as struct literals and never calls `updateActionIndex`, so it does
not exercise the cached classification and understates the result — measured through `ParseConfig`, as a server loads policies,
the same shape at 4000 policies goes from 66.1 ms to 660 us per authorization with allocations dropping from 88,888 to 1.
Allocation caveat: benchmarks with short bucket+key strings previously stack-allocated the per-statement copy and report
0 -> 1 allocs/op. Anything with a realistic object key allocated once per statement before and once per request now.
### Testing
- `policy/admin-action_test.go` (new): trap table for the fast path (`"*"` -> true, `"a*d*m*i*n*"` -> true, `"admin:heal"` ->
false, `"s3:*"` -> false, ...), the same for `HasResource`, an equivalence check against the previous linear scan over 964
patterns, and a differential fuzz target.
- `TestAdminActionNamespacePrefix` pins the invariant the fast path rests on — every `SupportedAdminActions` key starts with
`admin:`. Nothing enforced this before, and the analogous `s3:` invariant is *already* broken by `s3express:CreateSession` in
`SupportedActions`, so it can rot into an authorization change.
- `TestDecideReachesDenyOnlyAndIsOwnerWithNoStatements`: `Decide`'s `DenyOnly` and `IsOwner` returns sit below the deny loop, so
a policy with nothing to match must still reach them. An earlier draft of this change added an early return for the empty
case and silently turned both from allow into deny. Any future work narrowing which statements `Decide` walks needs this
test.
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR replaces recursive wildcard matching with iterative matching, adds admin-action prefix fast paths, caches statement and request-resource classification, reuses policy indexes during evaluation, and adds equivalence, fuzz, performance, and regression tests. ChangesPolicy matching and evaluation
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The PR improves policy matching and authorization performance, but the current head still has a concurrent request-state race, stale authorization classification risks, a remaining denial-of-service pattern in wildcard matching, and build failures from static analysis. These issues can cause incorrect authorization, excessive CPU use, or prevent successful builds, so the PR is not ready to merge until they are addressed. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Policy.Decide
participant Args
participant Statement.IsAllowedPtr
participant wildcard.Match
Policy.Decide->>Args: Build request resource once
Policy.Decide->>Statement.IsAllowedPtr: Evaluate policy statement
Statement.IsAllowedPtr->>wildcard.Match: Match action and resource patterns
wildcard.Match-->>Statement.IsAllowedPtr: Return match result
Statement.IsAllowedPtr-->>Policy.Decide: Return statement decision
Policy.Decide-->>Args: Return final policy decision
Suggested reviewers: Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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The cache preserves important request-path performance. The alternatives described would either retain the fail-open case or change existing authorization behavior.
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Functionality looks good, tested with a few scenarios and they all were correct with improved performance.
I ran this through a personal Claude skill I have that checks for "Claudisms" in doc comments (describing internal workings rather than external behavior, changelog-style doc comments, etc.). All requested changes are nit style preference to change at your discretion and non-blocking.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@policy/policy.go`:
- Around line 121-122: Update the exported Policy type comment to begin with
“Policy” and retain the requirement that Reindex must be called after changing
Statements on an already parsed policy.
Apply the same fix in `@policy/policy.go` at line 140.
In `@policy/statement.go`:
- Line 228: Remove the implementation-description comment above computeClass,
leaving the function and surrounding code unchanged unless the comment documents
a necessary invariant.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
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policy/admin-action.gopolicy/policy.gopolicy/statement.gowildcard/match.go
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PR 1 — security
fix(policy,wildcard): bound wildcard matching and close two Deny-dropping paths
Three independent correctness bugs on the authorization path. No API changes.
1.
wildcard.Matchwas exponential in the number of*deepMatchRunerecursed on both alternatives at every*, so its cost grew exponentially with the star count. The pattern is caller-supplied — statement validation classifies every action against every namespace, andResource.Matchruns untrusted patterns — so a tiny document could consume unbounded CPU:ParseConfig, action"*********x"ParseBucketPolicyConfig, same actionAdminAction.IsValid, 8 starsScaling was ~4x per added star: 6 stars 165 ms, 8 stars 4.5 s, 10 stars > 100 s.
MatchSimplewas equally affected, and it backs bucket-policy principal matching and CORS origin matching.Replaced with the standard greedy two-pointer matcher: one backtrack point, no recursion, no allocation, O(n*m) worst case.
MatchSimple's documented "a trailing?is optional" behaviour does not survive greedy backtracking — a first attempt that folded it into the matcher diverged onMatchSimple("*?*a", "a"). It is now expressed explicitly inMatchSimple: if the pattern does not match outright, any prefix of it ending at a?that consumes the whole name also matches. The matcher itself is now plain glob semantics with no mode flag.2.
Statement.hashomittedNotResourcesdropDuplicateStatementsswitches to hashing above 10 statements. Two statements differing only inNotResourcehashed identically, so one was discarded at parse time. When those areDenystatements, a restriction silently disappears from a policy that was written correctly.Reproduced: an 11-statement policy carrying two distinct
Deny ... NotResourcestatements loses one; the same policy with 4 statements (below the threshold, exact-comparison path) keeps both.3.
HasDenyStatementtrusted a field that struct-literal policies never sethasDenyis only assigned inupdateActionIndex, which runs fromUnmarshalJSONandMergePolicies. APolicybuilt as a struct literal never reaches it — including this package's ownreadonlyandconsolereadonlydefaults inconstants.go, both of which carryDeny admin:CreateUser.HasDenyStatement()reportedfalsefor them.That matters to callers that use the answer to route policies: AIStor sorts them into a "no deny statements" bucket, evaluates that bucket with an early return on the first
Allow, and never reaches theDeny. A principal holdingreadonlyplus any policy allowingadmin:CreateUserwas grantedadmin:CreateUser.HasDenyStatementnow falls back to scanning statements. It runs once per policy per merge, not per request.Compatibility
Fix 2 changes which statements survive parsing. A policy that was accidentally relying on the collapse regains a
Deny, so a request that previously succeeded may start returning 403. That is the intended direction, but it belongs in release notes.Fixes 1 and 3 are behaviour-preserving for any correctly-built input.
Testing
wildcard/match_equivalence_test.gokeeps the previous recursive matcher as a reference implementation and diffs against it: 254,512 exhaustive pattern/name/mode combinations (patterns over{a,b,*,?}to length 5,{a,:,/}names) plus a differential fuzz target. 101M fuzz executions, no divergence.TestMatchStarsAreLinearfails if a singleMatchwith 8/16/64/256 stars, or 32 interleaved*apairs, exceeds 50 ms.policy/parse_dos_test.goassertsParseConfigandParseBucketPolicyConfigstay under 2 s for star-heavy actions.TestDropDuplicateStatementsKeepsNotResourcescovers both the exact-comparison and hashed paths.TestHasDenyStatementOnStructLiteralPolicywalks the built-in defaults.go test ./...is green.PR 2 — performance
perf(policy): cut authorization cost for large policy collections
A production profile of a 24-node cluster found 61–73% of all CPU on client-facing nodes inside
Policy.Decide, and 51–61% inAdminAction.IsValidalone. The credential resolved to more than 4000 policies. Six changes, no API changes, no behaviour changes.AdminAction.IsValid/HasResource— O(1) fast pathBoth scanned their whole action map calling
wildcard.Matchper entry, with the receiver as the pattern.Statement.isAdmincallsIsValidfor every action of every statement it evaluates, so a pure-S3 statement paidlen(Actions) x 101wildcard matches to learn nothing.Now: exact map lookup; then bail if the pattern holds no metacharacter (a literal can only match by being in the map); then bail if the literal head before the first metacharacter is prefix-incompatible with
admin:.isAdmin, 1 actionisAdmin, 3 actionsThe head comparison is bidirectional on purpose:
adm*anda*d*m*i*n*are both valid admin patterns, so a plainstrings.HasPrefix(head, "admin:")would be a silent authorization change.actionStatementIndexwas a pessimisationDecideconsulted the index and then — hit or miss — fell through to an unconditional walk of every statement, re-evaluating everything the index had just evaluated. The index only ever helped when an indexed statement allowed. The walk now skips the positions the index already tried (indexesis ascending, andisAllowedForis pure).One classification pass instead of five, cached at parse time
IsAllowedPtrcalledisTable,isKMS,isSTS,isAdminandhasAdminResource, each ranging over the action set separately — four map-iterator setups per statement per authorization. Collapsed into oneclassify()pass, and cached on the statement byupdateActionIndex.The cached field's zero value means "not computed — derive it now", not "no namespace". A statement built as a struct literal, or cloned, is therefore slower rather than wrong, and
Statement.Clonedeliberately does not copy it.classifyis a pure function ofStatement.Actions, which nothing mutates after parse — the same invariantactionStatementIndexalready relies on.The request resource string is built once per request
IsAllowedPtrrenderedBucketName/ObjectNameinto a pooled buffer and then calledBuffer.String()— which copies — once or twice per statement. A memory profile of one authorization over 156 policies of 20 statements put 92.5% of all allocations on that one line: 1561 allocations and 75 KB of garbage per authorization.It depends only on the request, so it is now memoized on
Argsand passed to every statement.Argscarries the fields it was built from, so a caller reusing anArgsfor a second object cannot read a stale value.Note: one
*Argsmust not be shared across goroutines within a single evaluation.IsAllowedPardid share one; it now gives each worker its own copy.Measured
go test ./policy/ -run XXX -bench 'BenchmarkIsAllowed|BenchmarkSerialEvalVsParEval' -benchmem, on an idle 32-thread box:IsAllowed/SingleStatementAllowIsAllowed/DenyRuleIsAllowed/WildcardMatchingIsAllowed/MultipleStatementsSerialEvalVsParEval/128pserialSerialEvalVsParEval/1024pserialMultipleStatementsgains least because its statements have non-matching action sets, soActions.Matchshort-circuits before classification runs.SerialEvalVsParEvalbuilds policies as struct literals and never callsupdateActionIndex, so it does not exercise the cached classification and understates the result — measured throughParseConfig, as a server loads policies, the same shape at 4000 policies goes from 66.1 ms to 660 us per authorization with allocations dropping from 88,888 to 1.Allocation caveat: benchmarks with short bucket+key strings previously stack-allocated the per-statement copy and report 0 -> 1 allocs/op. Anything with a realistic object key allocated once per statement before and once per request now.
Testing
policy/admin-action_test.go(new): trap table for the fast path ("*"-> true,"a*d*m*i*n*"-> true,"admin:heal"->false,
"s3:*"-> false, ...), the same forHasResource, an equivalence check against the previous linear scan over 964patterns, and a differential fuzz target.
TestAdminActionNamespacePrefixpins the invariant the fast path rests on — everySupportedAdminActionskey starts withadmin:. Nothing enforced this before, and the analogouss3:invariant is already broken bys3express:CreateSessioninSupportedActions, so it can rot into an authorization change.TestDecideReachesDenyOnlyAndIsOwnerWithNoStatements:Decide'sDenyOnlyandIsOwnerreturns sit below the deny loop, so a policy with nothing to match must still reach them. An earlier draft of this change added an early return for the empty case and silently turned both from allow into deny. Any future work narrowing which statementsDecidewalks needs this test.Summary by CodeRabbit
Performance
Bug Fixes
Tests