feat(ai-red-teaming): add MCP tool-chain security to agentic-ai-security and emerging-threats - #10245
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feat(ai-red-teaming): add MCP tool-chain security to agentic-ai-security and emerging-threats#10245AAH20 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…ity and emerging-threats Both topics covered agentic/emerging AI risk only in general terms and predated the current MCP incident record. Adds: - agentic-ai-security: confused-deputy tool-credential forwarding and the Invariant Labs GitHub MCP prompt-injection/exfiltration disclosure, plus a link to the MCP spec's own authorization requirements. - emerging-threats: the April 2026 OX Security disclosure of an RCE flaw across the official MCP SDKs (Python/TS/Java/Rust), affecting an estimated 200,000 deployed servers - a concrete, dated example of the shared-tooling-layer risk class the topic already gestures at. Existing content and links kept as-is; new paragraph sentences and links appended.
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Both topics currently cover agentic/emerging AI risk only in general terms and predate the current MCP (Model Context Protocol) incident record. This adds current, sourced content to each — existing copy and links are kept as-is, new sentences and links are appended.
agentic-ai-security: adds confused-deputy tool-credential forwarding (a tool server forwarding a caller's token to a downstream service it was never issued for) and the Invariant Labs GitHub MCP disclosure (a malicious instruction hidden in a GitHub issue tricking an agent into exfiltrating private repo data through a fully-trusted tool), plus a link to the MCP spec's own authorization requirements.emerging-threats: adds the April 2026 OX Security disclosure of an architectural RCE flaw across the official MCP SDKs (Python/TypeScript/Java/Rust), affecting an estimated 200,000 deployed servers — a concrete, dated example of the "large-scale exploitation of interconnected AI systems" the topic already names, illustrating why a flaw in a shared tooling/protocol layer propagates differently than a single-vendor model vulnerability.Both additions are single-paragraph per the style guide, cite primary/official sources (the MCP spec itself, and the two firms' own disclosure writeups), and stay within the 8-link cap.