- Synthetic Open-PSA Models
- 1. OpenPSA Model Exchange Format
- 2. Generation of Models
- 3. Configuration of Models
- Configuration 1
c1-P_0.01-0.05
Arguments and Values - Configuration 2
c2-P_0.5-0.9
Arguments and Values - Configuration 3
c3-P_0.01-0.9
Arguments and Values - Configuration 4
c4-P_0.05-0.9
Arguments and Values - Configuration 5
c5-P_0.1-0.9
Arguments and Values - Configuration 6
c6-P_0.25-0.9
Arguments and Values - Configuration 7
c7-P_0.35-0.9
Arguments and Values
- Configuration 1
- 4. Usage
- 5. Additional References Related to Synthetic Models
This repository includes synthetic models in OpenPSA XML format. The goals of including these models are to:
- Serve as test cases for various PRA tools, including Open-PRA.
- Familiarize users with different modeling approaches and formats.
- Provide a reference for PRA model exchange.
- And more.
The repository also maintains a schema
for the models and provides four output files for each configuration to give users valuable insights.
The OpenPSA Model Exchange Format (MEF) represents about a decade of effort to develop a format independent of any specific quantification engine. The goal was to create a standard that researchers, corporations, and regulators could use collaboratively in an open environment.
Models are generated leveraging fault tree generator developed under SCRAM
Currently, the generated models are fault tree models. The configurations are listed below. Although 14 options are available for customizing fault trees, the following three arguments are preferred to create fault trees in different formats:
- The number of basic events
- Maximum probability for basic events
- Minimum probability for basic events
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.05 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.01 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.5 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.01 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.05 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.1 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.25 |
# | Arguments | Value |
---|---|---|
1 | Fault tree name | Autogenerated |
2 | The root gate name | root |
3 | The seed of the random number generator | 123 |
4 | The number of basic events | 100:50:5000 |
5 | The number of house events | 0 |
6 | The number of CCF groups | 0 |
7 | The average number of gate arguments | 3.0 |
8 | The weights of gate types [AND, OR, K/N, NOT, XOR] | [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0] |
9 | Percentage of common basic events per gate | 0.3 |
10 | Percentage of common gates per gate | 0.1 |
11 | The avg. number of parents for common basic events | 2 |
12 | The avg. number of parents for common gates | 2 |
13 | Maximum probability for basic events | 0.9 |
14 | Minimum probability for basic events | 0.35 |
These models can be used to test quantification engines. Additionally, they enable the creation of a verification platform between quantification engines, allowing developers or practitioners to cross-check their results. Moreover, these models serve as a foundation for benchmarking efforts for any quantification tool.
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