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Merge branch 'master' into gupnik/feeless
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@gupnik
gupnik authored Nov 13, 2023
2 parents 3f9faad + 5f4ce80 commit 9351d4b
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19 changes: 2 additions & 17 deletions polkadot/node/core/pvf/src/host.rs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -29,12 +29,11 @@ use crate::{
use always_assert::never;
use futures::{
channel::{mpsc, oneshot},
join, Future, FutureExt, SinkExt, StreamExt,
Future, FutureExt, SinkExt, StreamExt,
};
use polkadot_node_core_pvf_common::{
error::{PrepareError, PrepareResult},
pvf::PvfPrepData,
SecurityStatus,
};
use polkadot_parachain_primitives::primitives::ValidationResult;
use std::{
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -208,21 +207,7 @@ pub async fn start(config: Config, metrics: Metrics) -> (ValidationHost, impl Fu
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?config, "starting PVF validation host");

// Run checks for supported security features once per host startup. Warn here if not enabled.
let security_status = {
// TODO: add check that syslog is available and that seccomp violations are logged?
let (can_enable_landlock, can_enable_seccomp, can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root) = join!(
security::check_landlock(&config.prepare_worker_program_path),
security::check_seccomp(&config.prepare_worker_program_path),
security::check_can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root(
&config.prepare_worker_program_path
)
);
SecurityStatus {
can_enable_landlock,
can_enable_seccomp,
can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root,
}
};
let security_status = security::check_security_status(&config).await;

let (to_host_tx, to_host_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);

Expand Down
275 changes: 187 additions & 88 deletions polkadot/node/core/pvf/src/security.rs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,155 +14,254 @@
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Polkadot. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

use crate::LOG_TARGET;
use std::path::Path;
use crate::{Config, SecurityStatus, LOG_TARGET};
use futures::join;
use std::{fmt, path::Path};
use tokio::{
fs::{File, OpenOptions},
io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncSeekExt, SeekFrom},
};

/// Check if we can sandbox the root and emit a warning if not.
const SECURE_MODE_ANNOUNCEMENT: &'static str =
"In the next release this will be a hard error by default.
\nMore information: https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/maintain-guides-secure-validator#secure-validator-mode";

/// Run checks for supported security features.
pub async fn check_security_status(config: &Config) -> SecurityStatus {
let Config { prepare_worker_program_path, .. } = config;

// TODO: add check that syslog is available and that seccomp violations are logged?
let (landlock, seccomp, change_root) = join!(
check_landlock(prepare_worker_program_path),
check_seccomp(prepare_worker_program_path),
check_can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root(prepare_worker_program_path)
);

let security_status = SecurityStatus {
can_enable_landlock: landlock.is_ok(),
can_enable_seccomp: seccomp.is_ok(),
can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root: change_root.is_ok(),
};

let errs: Vec<SecureModeError> = [landlock, seccomp, change_root]
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|result| result.err())
.collect();
let err_occurred = print_secure_mode_message(errs);
if err_occurred {
gum::error!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"{}",
SECURE_MODE_ANNOUNCEMENT,
);
}

security_status
}

type SecureModeResult = std::result::Result<(), SecureModeError>;

/// Errors related to enabling Secure Validator Mode.
#[derive(Debug)]
enum SecureModeError {
CannotEnableLandlock(String),
CannotEnableSeccomp(String),
CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(String),
}

impl SecureModeError {
/// Whether this error is allowed with Secure Validator Mode enabled.
fn is_allowed_in_secure_mode(&self) -> bool {
use SecureModeError::*;
match self {
CannotEnableLandlock(_) => true,
CannotEnableSeccomp(_) => false,
CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(_) => false,
}
}
}

impl fmt::Display for SecureModeError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
use SecureModeError::*;
match self {
CannotEnableLandlock(err) => write!(f, "Cannot enable landlock, a Linux 5.13+ kernel security feature: {err}"),
CannotEnableSeccomp(err) => write!(f, "Cannot enable seccomp, a Linux-specific kernel security feature: {err}"),
CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(err) => write!(f, "Cannot unshare user namespace and change root, which are Linux-specific kernel security features: {err}"),
}
}
}

/// Errors if Secure Validator Mode and some mandatory errors occurred, warn otherwise.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// `true` if an error was printed, `false` otherwise.
fn print_secure_mode_message(errs: Vec<SecureModeError>) -> bool {
// Trying to run securely and some mandatory errors occurred.
const SECURE_MODE_ERROR: &'static str = "🚨 Your system cannot securely run a validator. \
\nRunning validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine.";
// Some errors occurred when running insecurely, or some optional errors occurred when running
// securely.
const SECURE_MODE_WARNING: &'static str = "🚨 Some security issues have been detected. \
\nRunning validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine.";

if errs.is_empty() {
return false
}

let errs_allowed = errs.iter().all(|err| err.is_allowed_in_secure_mode());
let errs_string: String = errs
.iter()
.map(|err| {
format!(
"\n - {}{}",
if err.is_allowed_in_secure_mode() { "Optional: " } else { "" },
err
)
})
.collect();

if errs_allowed {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"{}{}",
SECURE_MODE_WARNING,
errs_string,
);
false
} else {
gum::error!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"{}{}",
SECURE_MODE_ERROR,
errs_string,
);
true
}
}

/// Check if we can change root to a new, sandboxed root and return an error if not.
///
/// We do this check by spawning a new process and trying to sandbox it. To get as close as possible
/// to running the check in a worker, we try it... in a worker. The expected return status is 0 on
/// success and -1 on failure.
pub async fn check_can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root(
async fn check_can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root(
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "linux"), allow(unused_variables))]
prepare_worker_program_path: &Path,
) -> bool {
) -> SecureModeResult {
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] {
match tokio::process::Command::new(prepare_worker_program_path)
.arg("--check-can-unshare-user-namespace-and-change-root")
.output()
.await
{
Ok(output) if output.status.success() => true,
Ok(output) if output.status.success() => Ok(()),
Ok(output) => {
let stderr = std::str::from_utf8(&output.stderr)
.expect("child process writes a UTF-8 string to stderr; qed")
.trim();
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
// Docs say to always print status using `Display` implementation.
status = %output.status,
%stderr,
"Cannot unshare user namespace and change root, which are Linux-specific kernel security features. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider running with support for unsharing user namespaces for maximum security."
);
false
},
Err(err) => {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
"Could not start child process: {}",
err
);
false
Err(SecureModeError::CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(
format!("not available: {}", stderr)
))
},
Err(err) =>
Err(SecureModeError::CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(
format!("could not start child process: {}", err)
)),
}
} else {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Cannot unshare user namespace and change root, which are Linux-specific kernel security features. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider running on Linux with support for unsharing user namespaces for maximum security."
);
false
Err(SecureModeError::CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(
"only available on Linux".into()
))
}
}
}

/// Check if landlock is supported and emit a warning if not.
/// Check if landlock is supported and return an error if not.
///
/// We do this check by spawning a new process and trying to sandbox it. To get as close as possible
/// to running the check in a worker, we try it... in a worker. The expected return status is 0 on
/// success and -1 on failure.
pub async fn check_landlock(
async fn check_landlock(
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "linux"), allow(unused_variables))]
prepare_worker_program_path: &Path,
) -> bool {
) -> SecureModeResult {
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] {
match tokio::process::Command::new(prepare_worker_program_path)
.arg("--check-can-enable-landlock")
.status()
.await
{
Ok(status) if status.success() => true,
Ok(status) => {
Ok(status) if status.success() => Ok(()),
Ok(_status) => {
let abi =
polkadot_node_core_pvf_common::worker::security::landlock::LANDLOCK_ABI as u8;
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
?status,
%abi,
"Cannot fully enable landlock, a Linux-specific kernel security feature. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider upgrading the kernel version for maximum security."
);
false
},
Err(err) => {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
"Could not start child process: {}",
err
);
false
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableLandlock(
format!("landlock ABI {} not available", abi)
))
},
Err(err) =>
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableLandlock(
format!("could not start child process: {}", err)
)),
}
} else {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Cannot enable landlock, a Linux-specific kernel security feature. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider running on Linux with landlock support for maximum security."
);
false
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableLandlock(
"only available on Linux".into()
))
}
}
}

/// Check if seccomp is supported and emit a warning if not.
/// Check if seccomp is supported and return an error if not.
///
/// We do this check by spawning a new process and trying to sandbox it. To get as close as possible
/// to running the check in a worker, we try it... in a worker. The expected return status is 0 on
/// success and -1 on failure.
pub async fn check_seccomp(
async fn check_seccomp(
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "linux"), allow(unused_variables))]
prepare_worker_program_path: &Path,
) -> bool {
) -> SecureModeResult {
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] {
match tokio::process::Command::new(prepare_worker_program_path)
.arg("--check-can-enable-seccomp")
.status()
.await
{
Ok(status) if status.success() => true,
Ok(status) => {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
?status,
"Cannot fully enable seccomp, a Linux-specific kernel security feature. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider upgrading the kernel version for maximum security."
);
false
},
Err(err) => {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?prepare_worker_program_path,
"Could not start child process: {}",
err
);
false
},
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] {
match tokio::process::Command::new(prepare_worker_program_path)
.arg("--check-can-enable-seccomp")
.status()
.await
{
Ok(status) if status.success() => Ok(()),
Ok(_status) =>
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableSeccomp(
"not available".into()
)),
Err(err) =>
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableSeccomp(
format!("could not start child process: {}", err)
)),
}
} else {
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableSeccomp(
"only supported on CPUs from the x86_64 family (usually Intel or AMD)".into()
))
}
}
} else {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Cannot enable seccomp, a Linux-specific kernel security feature. Running validation of malicious PVF code has a higher risk of compromising this machine. Consider running on Linux with seccomp support for maximum security."
);
false
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")] {
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableSeccomp(
"only supported on Linux".into()
))
} else {
Err(SecureModeError::CannotEnableSeccomp(
"only supported on Linux and on CPUs from the x86_64 family (usually Intel or AMD).".into()
))
}
}
}
}
}
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