Authentication for APIs: a route says what reaching it requires, and one place enforces it. Full documentation: https://quillstack.org/auth
Where the users are kept, and what a user is, belong to the application. What belongs here is the part which is easy to get subtly wrong: comparing secrets in constant time, hashing what is stored, and making sure a rule written once is applied everywhere.
Authentication is a thing you get right once and then have to keep right. The failures are quiet ones — a comparison that leaks how close a guess was, a hash written straight to a column, a rule enforced in nine controllers and forgotten in the tenth. None of them announce themselves, and all of them are the sort of thing a route declaration and one middleware make structurally hard to get wrong.
- PHP 8.1 or newer
composer require quillstack/auth$router->get('/orders', OrdersController::class)->requireAuthentication();
$router->delete('/orders/:id', DeleteOrderController::class)->requireAuthentication('admin');The route is the one place that decides, and the middleware is the one place that enforces. A rule kept in each controller instead is a rule which is one day not kept — and the day it is not kept, nothing says so.
Nothing is guarded unless it says so, and any one of the roles named will do.
The application owns this, because only it knows where the tokens are:
use Quillstack\Auth\Identity;
use Quillstack\Auth\IdentityProviderInterface;
use Quillstack\Auth\Token;
final class Users implements IdentityProviderInterface
{
public function __construct(private readonly Orm $orm)
{
}
public function findByToken(string $token): ?Identity
{
$tokens = $this->orm->repository(ApiToken::class);
$found = $tokens->one($tokens->query()->where('hash', '=', Token::hash($token)));
return $found === null
? null
: new Identity($found->userId, $found->roles, ['email' => $found->email]);
}
}Point the framework at it and the middleware does the rest:
$app = new App(__DIR__ . '/../.env', [
IdentityProviderInterface::class => Users::class,
]);use Quillstack\Auth\Middleware\AuthenticationMiddleware;
public function handle(ServerRequestInterface $request): OrdersResponse
{
$identity = AuthenticationMiddleware::identityOf($request);
$identity?->id;
$identity?->hasRole('admin');
$identity?->attribute('email');
}It is worked out for every request, guarded or not — so an open route can still know who is reading it.
| Answer | Means |
|---|---|
401 NotAuthenticatedException |
nobody was recognised: no credentials, or credentials standing for nobody |
403 NotAuthorisedException |
somebody was recognised, and may not do this |
They are different on purpose: 401 says try again with credentials, 403 says do not
bother. No token and a token nobody knows are the same answer, because saying which of the
two it was tells whoever is guessing that they are close.
A request which matched no route is not turned into a refusal — a 404 becoming a 401
would say the page exists.
use Quillstack\Auth\Password;
$user->password = Password::hash($given);
if (Password::verify($given, $user->password)) {
// …
}The algorithm is whatever PHP currently considers best, and it changes when PHP does. The same password hashed twice gives two different hashes, because each carries its own salt — two identical rows in a table would say two people chose the same password.
Somebody signing in is the one moment their password is known, so it is the only moment an old hash can be brought up to date:
if (Password::verify($given, $user->password) && Password::needsRehash($user->password)) {
$user->password = Password::hash($given);
}use Quillstack\Auth\Token;
$token = Token::create(); // hand this to the client, once
$stored = Token::hash($token); // keep this
Token::verify($token, $stored);Two things go wrong with tokens written by hand: they are made from something guessable, and
they are compared with ===, which stops at the first byte that differs and so says how much
of a guess was right. Token::create() takes its randomness from the operating system, and
everything here compares with hash_equals().
A token is a password somebody else chose, so what is stored is a hash of it: a database somebody reads then holds nothing they can sign in with.
| Class | What it is |
|---|---|
Identity |
who a request is from: an id, roles, and whatever else the application carries |
IdentityProviderInterface |
findByToken(string $token): ?Identity — the one thing the application writes |
Middleware\AuthenticationMiddleware |
works out who, and enforces what the route asked for |
Credentials |
reads the Authorization: Bearer … header, without regard to the scheme's case |
Password |
hash(), verify(), needsRehash() |
Token |
create(), hash(), verify(), equals() |
Exceptions\AuthException |
what everything here extends; carries the status it means |
The identity travels on the request under AuthenticationMiddleware::IDENTITY, prefixed
because route parameters become attributes too.
There are no sessions, no cookies and no login form: this is for APIs, where the client holds a token. There is no permission language either — a role is a string, and anything finer is a question for the application, which knows what it is about.
Verifying a credential is the one thing here that happens on every single request, so it is the thing worth measuring. The comparison is against the two JWT libraries most PHP APIs reach for.
Read the result with its caveat first: these are not doing the same amount of work. A JWT carries its own claims, so verifying one answers who is this with no database involved. A stored token answers only is this the token — the application still has to fetch the row it belongs to, and that lookup costs far more than any number below. This measures the cryptographic step, not the cost of a request.
100,000 verifications, interleaved runs, median of five, PHP 8.4 on an M-series Mac:
| Package | Version | Per verification | |
|---|---|---|---|
| quillstack/auth | 0.8.0 | 0.53 µs | SHA-256, then hash_equals() |
| firebase/php-jwt | 7.1.0 | 2.91 µs | HMAC, base64, JSON decode |
| lcobucci/jwt | 5.6.0 | 2.88 µs | as above, through a parser and a validator |
What is loaded to do it, which does not vary by machine:
| Package | Files loaded | Memory | On disk |
|---|---|---|---|
| quillstack/auth | 1 | 81 KB | 112 KB |
| firebase/php-jwt | 2 | 177 KB | 116 KB |
| lcobucci/jwt | 28 | 198 KB | 312 KB |
So: cheaper per check, and it loads less to do it. That follows from doing less — hashing a string is cheaper than parsing a token, and it has to be, because unlike a JWT it is not the whole answer. Choose a JWT when you want a credential that needs no lookup and can be verified by a service that cannot reach your database. Choose this when you want a credential you can revoke, which a JWT cannot be without the lookup you were avoiding.
Password is not benchmarked. It calls PHP's password_hash(), as every honest
implementation does, and that function is deliberately slow — measuring it would compare PHP
to itself.
One thing the comparison turned up: firebase/php-jwt below 7.0.0 carries a
security advisory, and Composer refuses to
install it. If you are on ^6, that is worth knowing.
composer test
composer test:coveragecomposer stanThis is one component of Quillstack, a PHP framework which is as simple to use as it is strict about what it does.
- quillstack/router — where a route says what it requires
- quillstack/framework — where the middleware is wired in
- quillstack/orm — one way to keep the tokens
- quillstack/http-status — the codes these refusals carry
MIT — see LICENSE.